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On the African continent, home to the world’s largest standing herd of cattle, 
sheep, and goats, Tanzania’s abundant livestock resources rank third.  For almost forty 
years, these assets have held out the tantalizing prospect of supplying input to a thriving 
industry of leather production and manufacturing to benefit the nation’s economy.  The 
vision and seeming potential however, continue to remain largely unrealized.  Instead, 
disillusionment and even pessimism have come to characterize the ongoing failure of 
development within Tanzania’s leather industry.  The failures of development which 
characterize the Tanzanian leather industry epitomize the broader failures of development 
which cut across country and industry lines on the African continent. 
 
Introduction: The Sad Tale of the Tanzanian Leather Industry 
The history of Tanzania’s modern leather industry and the misbegotten plan for its 
development began in the mid 1970s.  Under the policy of import-substitution the 
Tanzanian government placed a high priority on establishing leather processing and 
manufacturing as a primary income producing industry for the nation.  The country’s 
socialist orientation following its independence in 1961 did not prevent Tanzania’s 
president—Julius Nyerere, a popular head of state with Western political leaders—from 
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securing development capital from the World Bank to set up government-run parastatals 
in the leather industry.  The attempt to advance a national leather industry underwritten 
by foreign aid proved to be a disappointing and expensive experiment with 
industrialization.  World Bank loans of over $40 million to the industrial leather cluster at 
Morogoro are among the most notorious examples of waste and inefficiency in the 
folklore of development history (Erixon, 2005).  The World Bank website provides 
standard funding data about various projects and programs.  The page describing bank 
involvement and activity at Morgoro notes that no project related documents are available 
at this time.  Under the heading “project goals,” it simply states “this item has been 
removed” (World-Bank, 2006). 
During the mid 1980s, the government hastily divested its leather parastatals with 
a view to promoting future industry development through the private sector.  Since the 
late 1980s foreign aid from a variety of international development organizations has 
supplemented private sector efforts to enlarge the leather industry.  For almost three 
decades, multilateral agencies have conducted research and published assessments of the 
Tanzanian leather industry and leather supply chain.  The resulting reports have launched 
many international agency-sponsored programs that have supplied expensive—and often 
useless—imported equipment and highly paid expatriate technical consultants for the 
purpose of developing Tanzanian leather processing.  Given the promising indicators 
noted by these international studies and the contributions of international aid, the most 
pertinent and inescapable question remains unanswered: why has development failed to 
occur on the predicted, or even on any significant, scale? 
Although not forthcoming about their own role in the problem and the lack of 
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measurable results in exchange for the development funds previously invested, 
international agencies themselves have lamented the failure of development in Africa’s 
leather industry generally and the case of Tanzania specifically.  According to one senior 
development official at the International Trade Centre (ITC), a multilateral agency of the 
European Union, the lack of mechanisms for collaboration within the African leather 
sector to facilitate regional integration badly constrains development.  ITC recommended 
creation of the African Federation of Leather and Allied Industries (AFLAI) in 1998 to 
establish a network of national leather associations for the most part under the auspices of 
international organizations.   
Despite development challenges, international aid agencies continue to predict a 
bright future for Africa’s tanning industry.  In 2003, the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), a United Nations (UN) agency, projected that global demand for 
raw skins, hides, and finished leather products would exceed supply in the coming decade.  
International Trade Forum, the magazine of ITC, cited figures indicating that total 
international trade in leather was one and a half times the value of the global meat trade, 
more than five times the coffee trade, and more than eight times the rice trade (Dadaglio, 
2003).  The Committee for Commodities (CFC), another UN agency estimated that 
between 2002 and 2003, world leather trade climbed from $50 to $60 billion and 
calculated that the leather market was far from saturated (Reinstra, 2004).   
Meet in Africa (MIA), a biennial conference series billed as the most important 
leather assembly on the African continent, was initiated by the ITC in 1998.  A dozen 
major UN and EU agencies collaborate with ITC to organize, support, and fund the event.  
Collaborators included Netherlands’ Center for the Promotion of Imports from 
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Developing Countries (CBI), Societe Internationale du Cuir (SIC SA) of France, 
Associoazione Nazionale Costruttori Macchine dell’area pelle (ASSOMAC) of Italy, the 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), and the Common Fund 
for Commodities (CFC).  The Expert Group Meeting on Trade and Development in the 
Leather Industry in Africa convened in conjunction with MIA 2002 (Jabbar, Kiruthu, 
Gebremedhin, & Ehui, 2002).   
Ten international agency-sponsored conference papers were presented to the 
group identifying leather trade and processing as well as the manufacture of finished 
leather goods as one of the most strategic agricultural and industrial sectors for 
developing African economies.  The studies examined the difficulties faced by Africa’s 
leather industry and contained conclusions that have become familiar over the last 
twenty-five years.  They referred to the potential for international and interregional 
leather trade, the promise of increased employment at every level of the leather supply 
chain from its beginning point in animal husbandry, and the prospect of manufacturing 
and marketing finished leather products.  Each study predicted that successful 
development of the leather industry would contribute significant benefits to the rural 
economies of less developed countries (LDCs), and help African states including 
Tanzania reduce poverty.  Additionally, they anticipated leather exports as a significant 
source of foreign exchange earnings for African national economies.  The expert group 
members urged development and revitalization of the leather industry as a critical step 
toward economic progress of LDCs.  Ironically, international agency reports have 
reiterated essentially the same conclusions every two years since 1984. 
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Since 1975, at least three cycles of foreign aid funding earmarked for 
industrializing Tanzanian leather production have been realized by means of both 
concessional foreign aid giving from multilateral organizations and loans from 
international financial institutions.  As mentioned earlier, the World Bank financed 
parastatals in the mid 1970s.  Beginning in 1989, the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO) funded the Regional African Leather and Footwear 
Industry Scheme (RALFIS), a major thirteen-year, three-phase leather industry 
development effort conducted in ten East African countries, among them Tanzania.  
RALFIS was co-sponsored by other UN agencies including the Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO), the Common Fund for Commodities (CFC), and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP).  Several EU multilaterals participated in the program 
as well.  In 2004, Tanzania’s leather industry, like the African leather sector on the whole, 
remained substantially as undeveloped as it had been thirty years earlier.  Interestingly, 
during the same period, leather processing in the developing economies of South East 
Asia and India experienced tremendous development and growth (Muchie, 2000).   
The latest push for developing Tanzanian leather called A Blueprint for the 
African Leather Industry is part of an initiative unveiled by UNIDO in 2004 (Scullion).  
The Blueprint is based on the MIA 2002 conference studies and is designed for use by 
development agencies and other stakeholders in opening up new opportunities for 
commercially exploiting hides and skins.  New statistics, reports, and projections 
constitute the basis for yet another round of program proposals for foreign aid funding to 
assist the Tanzanian leather industry and another cycle of promises for the growth and 
future development of its hides and skins resources.  The pattern of industry programs 
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driven by international organizations, employing foreign experts and imported industrial 
equipment that after thirty years has unsuccessfully addressed fundamental issues of the 
leather supply chain must eventually raise the question: Who in fact has benefited from 
foreign aid to industrialize Tanzanian leather?  LDC development hopes continue to be 
let down, yet the endeavors of international development agencies remain a virtual 
growth industry which was worth $79 billion globally in 2004.   
 
An Empirical Puzzle 
The leather industry in Tanzania presents an empirical puzzle that is relevant to 
development and to foreign aid.  When the puzzle is tied into current theory regarding the 
potential of foreign-aid assisted development, the outcome—stagnation—seems 
counterintuitive.  Foreign aid began as US foreign policy after World War II with the 
Marshall Plan, also known as the European Recovery Program.  The Marshall Plan was 
followed in the 1950s by Point Four, a project of technical assistance to underdeveloped 
countries.  From the beginning of the experiment with development assistance, some 
economists questioned aid assisted development, arguing that neither historical precedent 
nor fundamental economic theories existed for the practice.  Economists K. B. Griffin 
and J. L. Enos of Magdalene College, Oxford, called foreign aid “an unprecedented 
experiment without compelling theory or compelling evidence to demonstrate its 
effectiveness” (Griffin & Enos, 1970, p. 325).  The efficacy of foreign aid has been 
assumed (even in the face of contradictory evidence) rather than rigorously investigated 
and empirically verified.   
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A common focus of fault for the ineffectiveness of aid in producing development 
is donor unwillingness to invest the level of funding needed to accomplish the task.  
Some view the self interested motives of donor giving as a factor that substantially 
reduces the development impact of aid.  Assistance given for military and political 
objectives for example, may be inconsistent with the use of resources to enhance growth 
(Krueger, 1986).  The United States has made no secret of pursuing goals other than 
economic development by means of foreign aid.  Military security, promoting US exports 
and overseas investment, disposal of agricultural surpluses, and political support for 
friendly régimes have openly been goals of US foreign aid (Huntington, 1971). 
Donors in turn argue that recipient countries have not utilized development 
assistance well.  They claim that aid has failed to reduce poverty for a variety of reasons.  
For example: poor governments use aid for non-investment expenditures or in place of 
proper tax collection, fail to promote macroeconomic stability, waste aid on corruption, 
or cannot absorb more aid due the lack of administrative capacity.  ActionAid 
International, a pro-aid non-governmental organization working in South Africa 
challenges these claims and presents plausible responses.  For example, the limited 
capacity of poor countries to absorb aid results from cumbersome administration required 
by donors.  The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) force poor 
governments to undertake inappropriate policies as conditions of assistance, even though 
such conditionalities frequently fail to achieve the promised benefits of growth (Greenhill 
& Walt, 2005).   
The roles of recipients and donors each have been critiqued and theorized about 
extensively in the question of foreign aid effectiveness, but curiously absent from the 
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debate is serious scrutiny or investigation of the international development apparatus that 
administers aid.  Surprisingly few students of international development organizations 
have been critical of their performance or their utility even though evidence shows they 
produce undesirable outcomes repeatedly (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999).  Bilateral and 
multilateral development organizations have disbursed billions in aid funding over the 
past five decades, yet have managed steadfastly to avoid careful evaluation of their 
efforts.  While informal anecdotal criticism of the development community abounds, 
systematic empirical studies of its performance and the results of foreign aid programs 
are difficult to locate.   
 
Purpose of the Study 
The leather industry in Tanzania is a case of minimal development and ineffective 
foreign aid.  Budget statements of development programs expressed in dollar amounts 
have fostered the popular belief that foreign aid makes money available to recipients.  
However, this is a misconception (Gaud, 1968).  In reality, foreign aid consists primarily 
of the services and goods donors provide in the form of technical assistance (TA) and tied 
procurement (TP).  A valid question is: why do policy makers and development theorists 
take for granted an assumption that foreign aid provided in these forms functions exactly 
as does the capital variable in theoretical economic models of growth and development?  
Furthermore, questions arise about the delivery mechanism of foreign aid—international 
bureaucratic organizations.  Can development in a country really be promoted and 
accomplished by bureaucracy, or does it rather stymie development efforts?  This study 
will argue that foreign aid has not produced development because factors inherent in the 
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nature and structure of the international organizations that direct development and 
disburse foreign aid make these organizations unsuited to the task of promoting 
development   
Drawing on the work of Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises in his book 
Bureaucracy (1983), and researchers M. Barnett and M. Finnemore (1999) in The 
Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations, I suggest that certain 
incentives within international bureaucracies weaken their development mission.  I argue 
that growth theories regard flexibility, adaptability, and innovation as requisite for 
development progress—while these are the very qualities that bureaucracies oppose.   
I examine how attitudes within international organizations that are arguably 
imperialistic affect policies and program proposals.  I argue that these postures toward 
LDCs have historical roots in 19th century European colonialism and have found their 
way into international organizations where they manifest in a variety of ways.  Nobel 
laureate economist Gunnar Myrdal called the aid policies of developed countries toward 
underdeveloped countries a crucial political problem that, at bottom, was a moral issue.  
“The primordial problem is, how people in the developed countries think and feel about 
helping underdeveloped countries in their development efforts” (Myrdal, 1970, p. 310).  
The view of the donor-LDC relationship as a benefactor-supplicant association engenders 





The original research for this paper began with an extensive review of primary 
and secondary literature on the leather industry in Tanzania.  Information was available 
largely through international agencies of the UN, the EU in the form of industry studies 
and project descriptions of aid-funded programs conducted by the Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), 
the Industrial Development Decade for Africa (IDDA), the Common Fund for 
Commodities (CFC), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the 
International Trade Center (ITC), among others.   
My research located only one program evaluation, a report (UNIDO, 1997) that 
assessed the second phase of the Regional Africa Leather and Footwear Industrial 
Scheme (RALFIS).  This UNIDO program involved ten East African nations including 
Tanzania.  Review of the report uncovered issues concerning development and foreign 
aid in the context of Tanzania’s leather industry that led to further research on foreign aid 
effectiveness and international development bureaucracies.  The RALFIS evaluation will 
be examined as a case study of this paper’s thesis about the foreign aid bureaucracy. 
I argue that foreign aid has produced minimal results in less developed countries 
(LDC) first and foremost because at its conception following World War II, the role of 
aid was viewed principally as a means of controlling the world economic order and only 
incidentally as a means of assisting economic development.  The structure and function 
of foreign aid characterized as the “aid regime” has shaped development strategies in 
ways that have adversely affected aid recipients notwithstanding the prevailing public 
perception of a positive link between aid and development.  I further maintain that 
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foreign aid programs administered through massive bilateral and multilateral bureaucratic 
structures exert a kind of domination that interferes with development and hinders LDC 
economic progress.  Finally, foreign aid perpetrates imperialistic attitudes and practices 
that negatively affect the efforts of LDCs to promote economic development. 
 
Organization of Study 
Chapter 2 discusses characteristics of development as they relate to foreign aid.  
International regime analysis is employed to define the structure and function of foreign 
aid.  Two elements of aid—technical assistance and tied procurement—are explored with 
emphasis on how they conflict with aspects of development.  This section also presents a 
curious parallel between the theory used to rationalize reconstruction aid in the Marshall 
Plan and the theory later used to justify Third World development aid.   
Chapter 3 discusses the Weberian theory of bureaucracy as well as the pathologies 
that can occur within bureaucratic structure in order to draw implications about the 
suitability of bureaucracy as a means of administering foreign aid.  It further examines 
ways in which the activities of bilateral and multilateral agencies may thwart rather than 
promote development; and ways in which aid bureaucracies engage in self-serving 
behavior.   
Chapter 4 looks at 19th century imperialism to highlight parallel attitudes within 
the structure and function of today’s aid regime.  It explores how a mindset of superiority 
fosters policies that undermine national strategies, ignore national priorities, and promote 
dependency for an overall negative impact on LDCs development efforts. 
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Chapter 5 investigates the Phase II RALFIS Evaluation Report as a case study of 
foreign aid and development.  Based on three questions derived from the thesis of this 
paper, I analyze the reported program results by comparing whether donor priorities or 
recipient priorities are achieved. 
In conclusion, chapter 6 recommends a development funding method first put 
forward in an essay by economist, Albert Hirschman, Foreign Aid—A Critique and a 
Proposal (1968).  I briefly reconsider this alternative, noting that the revolution in 
information and communication technology that occurred in the intervening years since 
Hirschman’s original proposal, could support implementation of the model in ways that 




FOREIGN AID REGIME 
 
What is economic development? 
The field of development economics and the basic paradigms which underlie it 
originated together in Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, an essay that was chiefly 
concerned with promoting economic development in England (Dorfman, 1991).  The 
current focus among economists on economic development began immediately after 
World War II when former colonies of European-based empires became new nations.  
The poverty and instability of these least developed countries (LDC) placed development 
economics high on economists’ agendas.  Adelman and Morris  (1997) define economic 
development as “widespread, widely shared, sustainable economic growth accompanied 
by significant structural change in production patterns and in economic and political 
institutions and by generalized improvement in living standards of the poor” (p. 831).   
 
Four lessons of Comparative Development History 
Adelman and Morris (1967) studied the development history of seventy-four 
countries during the two so-called “golden eras of economic development”: the Industrial 
Revolution and the post-World War II period between 1950 and 1965.  Applying 
systematic econometric analysis to the patterns of interaction among social and political 
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variables and proxies for economic institutions and policies, they investigated various 
aspects of development.  Relatively homogenous countries were grouped into clusters 
defined by both a common development process and common initial conditions or by a 
series of institutional developments.  The comparisons yielded four major lessons that are 
useful in identifying factors that are significant to development.  
The first lesson of comparative development history is that the process of 
economic development has been “highly nonlinear and highly multifaceted” (Adelman & 
Morris, 1997, p. 833).  This contradicts any notion that there are universal patterns of 
growth or sequences of economic development and institutional change.  Historically, 
development has followed at least four distinct paths : (1) the autonomous export-led 
industrialization path that first comers to the Industrial Revolution followed; (2) the 
government-led inward-oriented industrialization path followed by late comers to the 
Industrial Revolution; (3) the balance growth, open-economy, limited government 
intervention path pursued by a few small European countries; and (4) the agricultural, 
primarily export-oriented and sharply dualistic path pursued by both land abundant 
countries and densely populated ones.   
Similarly, contemporary developing countries demonstrate strikingly diverse 
patterns of economic and institutional changes even among countries with comparable 
initial conditions.  The forty percent of developing countries at the lowest end of the 
socioeconomic spectrum had dualistic development, meaning that although a modern, 
export-oriented primary sector developed, corresponding market institutions and political 
systems did not develop.  Intermediate transitional economies proceeded far enough in 
modernization to disturb traditional customs and institutions but not far enough to 
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produce self-sustaining economic development.  In the third most developed group of 
countries, crucial factors in their economic performance depended on the effectiveness of 
economic institutions and the extent of national mobilization for development (Adelman 
& Morris, 1997).  Thus, historical and contemporary experiences indicate that 
development depends on the interplay of many factors.  
“No single theory is likely to offer an equally good explanation over the entire 
range of development experience… and policy prescriptions based on 
generalizing across countries at very different levels of socio-institutional and 
economic development are likely to be seriously misleading” (p. 834). 
 
The study’s second finding about comparative development history was that 
domestic institutions were the distinguishing factor in explaining which transitional 
countries became economically developed and which did not (Adelman & Morris, p. 834).  
For example, countries with favorable land tenure systems, developed market institutions, 
and political systems responsive capitalist interests developed first during the 18th and 
19th centuries.  In the 20th century between 1950 and 1973, developing countries with the 
most advanced economic and political institutions benefited most from the growth 
generated by trade with developed countries.  The indispensable corollary of this lesson is 
that a government must build political and economic institutions as a precursor to 
developing its national economy. 
The land-abundant countries of Argentina, Brazil, Australia, and New Zealand, 
for instance, illustrate how domestic institutions affected the rate of growth and the 
spread of development benefits in nations that shared similar initial conditions.  All four 
were settled by Europeans during the late 19th century, yet differing systems of land 
tenure and politics resulted in sharply disparate economic outcomes.  In Argentina and 
Brazil, land concentration in the hands of politically powerful domestic elites accelerated 
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economic growth but intensified existing class inequality.  By contrast, economic growth 
in Australia and New Zealand was more equitable because universal male suffrage 
increased political power for the middle and working-classes.   
The third lesson of the Adelman and Morris study was that development involves 
a variety of substitutions for incomplete or missing elements in developing economies.  
Historically and in contemporary transitional economies, domestic governments, foreign 
institutions, and international trade have supplied inadequate or missing domestic 
elements.  The precise mix, however, has varied even among countries at similar levels of 
industrial development.   
The fourth lesson is that economic policies and government actions respecting 
trade, agriculture, and investment were critical at every level of development.  
Nevertheless, the required actions and their relative effectiveness varied by the 
developmental level of the economy. 
 
Misleading Development Theory and Policy 
The most important implication of these four lessons is that growth and 
development theories suffer from “misplaced universality and from tunnel vision” 
(Adelman & Morris, p. 838).  Universal prescriptions for economic development are out 
of place.  The institutions and policies appropriate to each phase of development, and the 
transitions needed to shift between phases, are context specific.  Adelman and Morris 
(1997) argue that a major reason for the limited development success among LDCs for 
the past 50 years has been the nature of the guidance they received from development 
economists and international institutions committed to universal principles and simplicity 
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in theory and policy.  Unsuitable theories and policies “cannot avoid delaying or 
altogether blocking development” (p. 839).  Policies and institutions do not transfer well 
across development levels or between situations with different institutional settings and 
initial conditions.  Each level of development presents a variety of possible paths, 
policies, institutional and social changes. 
The requirements of development, nonetheless, turn out to be “more tolerant of 
cultural and institutional variety” than limited prior experience assumed (Hirschman, 
1965, p. 389).  Political economist Albert Hirschman argues that theories that make the 
elimination of particular defects into “prerequisites for any forward movement” are 
suspect.  Countries can overcome a missing conventional prerequisite in at least two 
distinct ways: either they invent their own substitute or the prerequisite turns out to be 
dispensable after all (p. 391).  Policy-makers must perceive the possibilities for 
adaptation.   
Obstacles to development are usually defined as “the absence of a condition that 
was found to be present in a country that subsequently developed” (p. 387).  If particular 
circumstances that held during the active development of advanced countries are absent 
in LDCs, these lacks are automatically construed as obstacles to development.  This leads 
to the “dismal” and “implausible” conclusion that the more countries develop the more 
difficult it is for the remainder to do likewise.  Hirschman concludes, as Adelman and 
Morris that countries take multiple paths to development and may all develop 
successfully by very different routes toward the goal.  Aid providing institutions such as 
the World Bank and the IMF have paid little attention to these conclusions in their efforts 
to assist LDC development.  Instead, they have tended to support only a particular 
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development paradigm while excluding all others—a policy that does not comport with 
historical or contemporary development experience. 
 
Capital and Development 
In classical theories of economic growth from Adam Smith and David Ricardo to 
John Stuart Mill, the accumulation of capital plays the central role in economic growth.  
Increasing capital stock supplied the means of employment and social welfare depended 
on the growth rate of capital.  Encouraging savings and investment was therefore all-
important.  Karl Marx, despite his dissident views, also qualified as a classical theorist 
because he espoused Ricardo’s theory of value.  Marx injected the notion that economic 
development was causally linked to political and social development.  He paid attention 
to the idea of technological developments as an important impetus to economic growth.   
The next significant contribution was from Schumpeter’s theory of innovation 
generated growth.  This theory shifted attention away from increasing capital stock and 
concentrated on innovation as the engine of growth in contemporary and future 
economies.  The theoretical approach of Walt Rostow, who wrote during the postwar 
period, divided economic development into a sequence of stages.  During a long period of 
gradual growth, an economy attained the “preconditions for takeoff” followed by “takeoff, 
the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass consumption” (Dorfman, 1991, p. 581).  
Rostow’s stages of growth theory along with the Harrod-Domar growth model, a model 
relating savings to investment helped to provide the rationale for bilateral and multilateral 
foreign aid policy beginning in the 1950s. 
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What is foreign aid?   
The following characterizations of foreign aid reflect the ambivalence associated 
with its practice.  In A Political Theory of Foreign Aid , theorist Hans Morganthau (1962) 
observed foreign aid is “a baffling innovation of the modern age” (p. 301).  Economist 
Albert Hirschman (1968) wrote in Foreign Aid—A Critique and A Proposal, “Aid is as 
Janus-faced an institution as can be found” (p. 1).  George Ball, Undersecretary of State 
for Economic and Agricultural Affairs for two administrations during the 1960s said, 
“Foreign aid is a deceptive phrase that comprehends programs and policies dissimilar in 
motive and effect” [quoted in (Wood, 1986, p. 5)].   
Attempts to classify the forms of aid in terms of the underlying donor motivation 
produce an “endless set of categories” (p. 5).  On the one hand foreign aid is an 
instrument of national policy used by rich nations to gain influence and increase their 
power.  On the other hand, by redistributing income from rich countries to poor countries, 
foreign aid has the potential to assist in hastening development in the latter (Hirschman, 
1971).  But foreign aid suffers from ambiguity about its “real” function.  When the 
benefits that redound to the donor are taken into account, “the imagery of gift-giving 
embedded in… aid becomes questionable” (Wood, 1986, p. 14).  In the official lexicon of 
the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), an international 
organization of donor governments, foreign aid is defined by its source, its level of 
concessionality, and the motivation for it.  Transfers of resources must be from a public 
source, at lower than market terms, and for the purpose of assistance. 
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Aid to investment to growth 
Aid proponents have argued for more than fifty years that poor countries lack the 
infrastructure to support economic activity precisely because they lack the funds for 
investment.  The original justification for development aid hypothesized a financing gap 
based on the difference between domestic savings and the capital needed for investment.  
Because poor countries have low per capita income, savings are also low.  Following this 
reasoning, donors simply calculate the financing gap and supply the foreign aid needed to 
fill it, in order for countries to promote development (Erixon, 2005).   
The financing gap was based on the Harrod-Domar growth model developed in 
the 1940s.  The model’s logic was simple: per capita income determined savings and 
savings determined investment.  The Chenery-Stout model refined Harrod-Domar by 
proposing an additional gap between import requirements and the foreign exchange to 
finance them.  The two-gap financing model became the standard rationalization for aid 
packages.  However, misgivings about the model were expressed as early as 1957 in an 
article on economic growth by Robert Solow (Easterly, 1999).  
Domar himself immediately acknowledged that his model was intended as a 
description of investment driving the short run business cycles in developed economies, 
not a theory of long term growth and development in LDCs (Easterly, 1999).  Economists 
questioned two features implied by the model: a one-to-one correspondence between aid 
and investment; and a fixed linear relationship between investment and growth in the 
short run.  K. Griffin and  K. Enos (1970) maintained that there is no theoretical or 
empirical justification for presuming a short run proportional relationship between 
growth and investment requirements and that the aid policy of filling a financing gap 
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determined by investment requirements would not raise investment or growth in the short 
run (Easterly, 1999).   
Economist Gustav Papanek (1972) called it “curiously naïve” to assume that each 
dollar of foreign aid would result in an increase of one dollar in savings and therefore 
investment.  According to Papanek the assumption that foreign resources exactly add to 
domestic savings had no basis in traditional economic analysis.  “On the contrary, 
conventional theory holds that, additional resources are used only in part to augment 
investment” (p. 935).  The third contestable aspect of the Harrod-Domar model relates to 
the applicability of Western economic theory to third world development.  This model 
assumes the support of institutional structures and market integration that often do not 
exist in LDCs.  “But the model lived on in the development literature” (Easterly, 2002).   
 
The Aid Regime 
In the book From Marshall Plan to Debt Crisis, author Robert Wood (1986), a 
sociologist and Assistant Professor at Rutgers University, argues that the structure and 
function of foreign aid financing has shaped the development choices and constraints of 
the Third World.  Employing international régime analysis, a theory developed within the 
field of international relations, to conceptualize foreign aid, Wood defines what he 
subsequently calls the aid regime by the principles, norms, rules, and procedures around 
which “the expectations of actors” converge within an aid and development community 
(p. 96).  Principles are the accepted beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude.  Norms are 
standards of behavior, rules are specific prescriptions for action, and procedures are the 
prevailing practices of collective decision-making (Wood, 1986, p. 97).  The regime 
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approach helps to clarify the logic of aid provision by describing a set of “injunctions that 
affect the calculations and decisions of both donors and recipients” (p. 7). 
The aid régime regulates five fundamental areas of concessional financing: 1) the 
framework for negotiating financial transfers between donors and recipients; 2) the 
situations where aid is appropriate; 3) the relationships among donors; 4) the relationship 
between aid and broader development policies; and 5) the credit worthiness of recipients.   
The fundamental characteristic of the aid regime framework is pervasive 
bilateralism. Aid discussions take place between single donors and single recipients.  
Even when the donor is a multilateral organization rather than a donor state, the 
transaction is bilateral.  The situations where aid is considered appropriate are controlled 
not only by where donors choose to allocate aid, but also by the sectors and industries 
from which donors withhold giving in a practice referred to as strategic non-lending. If 
private capital is available within a certain industrial sector, then recipients must seek 
these resources first.  Among donors there are grounds for deciding which source of aid is 
appropriate for a given request.  This avoids inter-agencies struggles while providing the 
rationale for a kind of institutionalized non-competition between donors.  The result is 
circumscribed choices of recipient countries in aid negotiations.   
Conditionality governs the relationship of aid to broader economic issues.  In 
2007, the prerogative of international financial institutions to prescribe certain policies 
and structural adjustment programs for LDCs is completely taken for granted by 
recipients as well as aid donors.  This was not the case early in the 1970s, when this 
policy was still being discussed only behind closed doors. 
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In 1968, Teresa Hayter (1971) was a member of the research staff of the Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI), a non-government body aimed at ensuring wise action in 
overseas development.  She wrote Aid As Imperialism, a book charging that the policy of 
“leverage” (what later became known as conditionality) practiced by the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) constituted interference within sovereign states on behalf of 
commercial agendas.  She urged deeper consideration of whether such a policy should be 
allowed within international organizations.  The World Bank, which had funded the study, 
objected to anything being written on leverage.  In the end, the Bank refused to publish 
the work and tried instead to suppress its publication.  Today, conditionality—essentially 
the transfer of national sovereignty to the bureaucrats of international organizations that 
lack transparency and accountability—is virtually unquestioned within donor institutions. 
According to Wood (1986), “The entire system of external financing for the Third 
World rests on the accumulation and servicing of debt” (Wood, 1986, p. 102). The 
relationship between aid and debt is the fifth fundamental area of concessional financing 
regulated by the aid regime.  It is a troubling aspect of the aid régime and the central 
focus of Wood’s book.  However, it is outside the scope of this paper. 
Régime analysis usually deals with complex interdependence in situations of 
reciprocity.  The bilateralism and power asymmetry in the donor recipient relationship as 
well as the diverse purposes of aid represent grounds on which the application of regime 
analysis of foreign aid might be questioned.  Typically, regime analysis pertains to single 
issues rather than the diverse purposes that foreign aid represents.  Nonetheless, the 
standard operating presumptions about allocating foreign aid, the widely shared ideas 
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about the conditions that should govern access to aid and the type of development that aid 
should promote make the régime approach particularly apt for the examination of foreign 
aid.  
 
The Current Flow of Foreign Aid 
The figures in this paper attempt to illustrate simply the essential elements of the 
aid regime.  Figures 1 shows the actors in the current foreign aid régime -- donors, 
recipients, and international organizations are represented by ellipses.  The bilateral 
(state-directed) and multilateral (international organization-directed) bureaucracies that 
transfer resource through their programs are depicted as parallel structures.  The 
influence of knowledge and expertise that legitimates and justifies the domination of 
development efforts by international organizations is represented in the top right hand 
corner of the diagram.  Finally, the presence of special interest groups that influence and 
profit from foreign aid, appear at every juncture of the system and are symbolized by 
squares.  Figure 2 illustrates how an alternative funding method might be introduced 
gradually to circumvent the current system.  Figure 3 proposes a new funding scheme 
that will be discussed in the conclusion.   
Figure 1 illustrates the bilateral framework on the donor recipient connection.  
While domination is not inherent to bilateralism, the power asymmetry of aid allows it 
for the most part to function in that manner.  Donors control the flow of resources and 
direct the program initiative.  Thus, they exercise power over strategic non-lending, 
conditionality, and debt.  Institutionalized non-competition shows in the duplicate and 
parallel bilateral and multilateral structures of donor and international bureaucracies.  
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Recipients face an aid monopoly that allows them absolutely no choice in pursuing 
development—a process that absolutely requires flexibility, adaptability, and innovation.   
 
The Components of Foreign Aid 
The words “aid” and “assistance” refer to flows which qualify as Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) or Official Aid (OA).  Bilateral flows are provided 
directly by a donor country to an aid recipient country.  Multilateral flows are channeled 
via an international organization active in development (e.g. World Bank, UNDP).  The 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD collects and publishes statistics 
of the official and private resource flows to all aid receiving countries.   
In 1968, USAID administrator William Gaud said that the biggest single 
misconception about foreign aid in the public debate was the idea that the US “sends 
money abroad to assist countries in their development” (Gaud, 1968, p. 603).  This belief 
still persists in popular thinking.  In fact, ninety-three percent of USAID funds were spent 
directly in the US to pay for products and services that went abroad.  In 1967, 4000 
American firms in 50 states received $1.3 billion of USAID funds for products supplied 
as part of the foreign aid program (p. 603).  In 2007, the USAID web site shows that the 
agency awards approximately $4 billion annually in grants and contracts to 3500 
American businesses and over 300 private organizations in providing economic 
assistance to developing nations.  US foreign aid consists of American personnel and 
American goods—equipment and raw materials—provided for specific programs and 
projects.  Aid funds pay the salaries of American experts who work directly for the 
Government or American businesses and universities that carry out technical assistance 
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contracts with USAID.  Contrary to the common impression that American food 
surpluses comprise food aid, Gaud noted that one third of the total food aid program 
consist of American fertilizer, pesticides, equipment, technical assistance, and research. 
 
What Is Technical Assistance? 
Technical assistance as defined by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) as foreign aid funding for three main categories: personnel 
consisting of long-term and short-term experts, both expatriate and national; study 
assistance through scholarships and internships for developing country nationals in donor 
countries; and research into the problems of developing countries, including research 
related to disease (Greenhill, 2006).  Official OECD statistics indicate that global 
technical assistance (TA) was nearly $19 billion in 2004 or roughly a quarter of total 
global aid.  Large donors, however, spent more than one-third of their Overseas 
Development Aid (ODA) on technical assistance.  
In fact, figures from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of OECD 
considerably underestimate the true extent of foreign aid that technical assistance 
represents because multilaterals such as the UN, EU, World Bank, and IMF do not report 
their data to DAC (Greenhill, 2006).  UN technical assistance alone is estimated at $2 to 
$3 billion a year, and the EU probably accounts for another $3 billion (p. 28).  In 2003, 
IMF spending for 300 person years of direct technical assistance services was over 
$190,000,000 which amounted to $633,000 per person year [my calculation] (Selowsky, 
2005, p. 2).  The largest foreign aid donors in absolute terms, the U.S., France, Germany, 
and Japan, account for 75 percent of all technical assistance.  In Australia and Greece, 
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technical assistance accounts for over 40 percent of total ODA in recent years.  Official 
statistics also fail to tell how budgets for technical assistance are actually spent.  Areas 
funded through TA can vary from a research project in a northern university or a grass-
roots teacher training project.  Salary expenditures may range from long-term expatriate 
experts to short term national consultants employed for a day or two.  The lack of data 
categories makes it difficult to assess the real scale and impact of technical assistance.   
 
Effectiveness of Technical Assistance 
Technical assistance has been heavily criticized as overpriced, ineffective, and 
deeply flawed as it promotes an outdated development model that undermines the 
priorities of LDCs.  R. Greenhill (2006), in Real Aid 2: Making Technical Assistance 
Work, documents the continuous critical assessments of the TA starting as far back as 40 
years ago with the following examples [quoted in (Greenhill, p. 28)]:  
1969 Experience indicates that technical assistance often develops a life of its 
own, little related either in donor or recipient countries to national or 
global development objectives—Pearson Commission Report 
1989 The vast bulk of technical experts and expertise provided by the UN donor 
system has outlived its usefulness, and that the time has come to rethink 
the purpose of aid and technical assistance within the UN system—
Richard Jolly, of the Institute of Development Studies 
1993 The use of expatriate resident technical advisers by aid donors is a 
systematic destructive force undermining the development of capacity in 
LDCs—Edward Jaycox, former World Bank vice president and African 
director 
2002 The traditional form of technical assistance is an anachronism that is no 
longer viable—The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
 
Key problems with technical assistance include: 1) TA is heavily tied to donor 
country firms.  The associated tender and contract arrangements limit competition, and 
aid program and project allocations hide significant spending on technical assistance.  
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Technical assistance is excluded from OECD arrangements on untying.  2) TA does a 
poor job responding to local demand often excluding policy options and steering 
nationals to donor preferred reforms.  3) Duplication of TA is widespread.  For example, 
in Vietnam, sixty different TA projects funded by twenty-three different donors with little 
apparent coordination studied various aspects of Vietnam's membership in the World 
Trade Organization (WTO).   
In 2004, ActionAid (Greenhill & Walt, 2005) estimated that the markup from 
tying technical assistance was 15 percent to 40 percent.  The extra cost of generous living 
and travel expenses that local experts would not incur subtracts from the value of TA.  
Based on available evidence ActionAid assumes that around half of the amount spent on 
TA does not enhance institutional capacity or improve management of resources in the 
recipient countries.  The additional costs for expatriate advisers, and their weak 
contribution to enhancing institutional capacity means that an estimated 75 percent of TA 
is what ActionAid refers to as phantom aid. 
 
Donor Benefits of Technical Assistance 
Donor driven technical assistance is heavily oversupplied, overpriced, and 
concentrated on expatriate consultants at very high pay rates.  Technical assistance 
contracts are awarded overwhelmingly to firms from the donor country.  Consultancy 
firms are strongly motivated to create demand for their services because technical 
assistance provides a good source of income for home firms.  In Sweden, a consortium of 
firms lobbied the government for access to aid funds arguing that industry engagement in 
aid projects would create qualified job prospects in Sweden (Greenhill, p. 35).   
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In Tanzania, a typical adviser costs $200,000 per year (Greenhill, p. 30).  In 
Cambodia, donors spent an estimated $50 million to $70 million on 700 international 
consultants in 2002—roughly equivalent to the wage bill for 160,000 Cambodian civil 
servants—donor financed consultants to the Cambodian government received upward of 
200 times the salary of their Cambodian counterparts; in India, the Department for 
International Development (DFID), the British foreign aid agency, spent $40 million in 
just six months on technical assistants from Credit Suisse First Boston.  The total bill for 
foreign consultants in this program eventually rose to $110 million.  In Vietnam, one 
DFID official estimated that foreign experts were typically paid between $18,000 and 
$27,000 per month compared to $1500-$3000 for local experts (Greenhill & Walt, 2005).  
In Nepal, the amount required to hire one foreign adviser in 1986 would have paid fifty to 
seventy local experts (Mathur, 1986, p. 173). 
The OECD reported in 2005 that the overall effectiveness of technical assistance 
had been subjected to little data based analysis in terms of its cost benefit, its impact on 
growth, or other financial measures (Greenhill, p. 26) Yet technical assistance remains 
one of the most heavily used forms of aid.  TA accounts for one quarter to one half of all 
official development assistance (ODA).  There have been few systematic attempts to 
assess the contribution if any of technical assistance to the long-term capacity for 
development in developing countries, but it is widely agreed that TA has fallen far short 
of expectation.  TA tends to leave little development behind once donor payments cease 
and in some cases it even serves to erode the existing capabilities of poor countries to 
determine their own development paths due to approaches that are geared to satisfying 
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Aid tying signifies that the recipient is in some way restricted in the allocation of 
financial resources it receives in the form of grants and loans.  Aid tying by bilateral and 
multilateral donors has important consequences for developing countries.  Tying aid to 
specific commodities and services, or to procurement in a specific country or region, can 
increase development project costs by as much as 20 to 30 percent.  The underlying 
economic and political motivations for tying of aid have indirect as well as its direct costs 
to recipients. 
 
Do Foreign Experts Really Contribute? 
Appraising the UN expert is no longer the exclusive purview of his superiors in 
the employing agencies (Mathur, 1986).  National planners and administrators, scholars 
and others interested in development problems are observing as well, and country 
nationals have became increasingly dissatisfied with international experts and the UN 
system.  They question whether technical assistance really contributes to development in 
a meaningful way.  Mathur argued that the development results of technical assistance in 
Asia were incommensurate with the level of expectation.  The approach to development 
issues of many UN experts and their style of functioning with national counterparts raised 
questions about their ability to foster development.  One former UN official argued that 
despite looking impressive, UN technical assistance was “only marginal” and countries 
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developed before the UN existed without all the “paraphernalia of technical assistance, 
seminars, conferences, training programs, and so on” (Mathur, p. 167).   
 
Lack of knowledge and dedication 
Changing expectations have increased disenchantment with expatriate experts.  
Nationals maintain that international experts tend to proceed with their own ideas based 
on their backgrounds, with attitudes that are unsettling to host government values and 
policies.  Many doubt the capacity of foreigners to comprehend the real development 
issues and ramifications for the host country and thus question whether experts really 
contribute or just complicate the development process (Mathur, p. 171). 
Nepalese nationals felt UN experts were preoccupied with their own situations—
office politics, personal power, and accumulation of wealth—rather than really dedicated 
to the development task.  Experts were employed by donors and directly beholden to their 
wishes and demonstrated little commitment to the Nepalese efforts.  “The busiest days for 
expatriates were when their bosses visited Nepal” (Mathur, p. 171).  Not learning the 
language of the host country confined expatriate contacts to elite groups in the capital or 
major towns to the neglect of grassroots development issues.   
Complaints of a “pro-consular manner” of behavior that imposed directives rather 
than consultation and cooperation are common, as are observations of higher levels of 
living, and paternalistic attitudes (Mathur, p. 172).  Local counterparts resent holding 
subordinate and assistant position, while the foreign experts take over and run projects as 
an enclave administration.  Expatriates appeared unwilling to be integral parts of the team 
preferring instead to keep to themselves aloof and separate, acting primarily as 
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watchdogs for the funding agency.  Experts often perpetuated their positions by slowing 
down the skills transfer process if it served their purposes.  Local experts felt they could 
do the job at a fraction of the cost of foreign experts.  The amount required to pay one 
foreign adviser could hire thirty to fifty Nepalese.  Thus, expatriates represented lost 
opportunities to local experts. 
Nevertheless, foreign experts thrive because international agencies design 
development assistance packages with tempting offers that make nationals beholden 
(Mathur, p. 173).  National officials highly value study visits abroad, vehicles, and air 
conditioners.  In most countries the salaries of civil servants are incredibly low.  The per 
diem allowances from an international agency for a one-week trip can be as much as a 
civil servant's monthly salary.  Incentives like these in development funding cast a new 
light on the corruption issue in the Third World.  Donor actions and foreign aid itself may 
well be complicit in the scandal of corruption. 
Critical assessments of international experts cannot be the whole story.  Experts 
of course have their own perspective.  The failures of some advisors are emphasized and 
the good work of others is unrecognized.  Expatriate experts often work in poor 
conditions that do not support optimal performance.  The new environment and new 
culture affects their performance.  Furthermore, without foreign experts some 
development projects simply would not proceed.  Third World governments are quick to 
object to any reduction in development assistance.  Haphazard and uncoordinated 
development plans prevent host governments from adequately utilizing expatriate 
services.  If experts do not get the needed logistical and administrative support and there 
are delays in providing counterpart personnel, skills transfer becomes difficult.  The 
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organization of UN agencies compound problems experts in the field face.  Recruiting 
personnel based on geographical distribution makes it difficult to get the best person for 
the job.  Training is not well developed and even when experts are technically proficient 
they may lack training in sociological aspects of development work.   
 
Problems of UN Coordination 
The UN and other international development agencies undertake development 
efforts with projects imposed from the top.  Over the years the UN system has evolved 
into a large and very complex organization that continues to multiply “in a manner and 
on a scale for which there is no rational justification” (Mathur, p. 179).  The introduction 
of diverse uncoordinated programs by numerous autonomous agencies distorts priorities 
in member countries wasting funds and energy.  The system is inherently inefficient 
because all decision-making is centralized at headquarters.  Experts lack the authority to 
respond on their own to host country suggestions for adapting projects or changing 
implementation.  Insistence that recipient countries follow imported models produces 
management problems and produces poor results.  External agencies come up with and 
impose sophisticated project designs from other settings that LDCs cannot administer or 
implement and thus flatly resist. 
 
IFI Corruption 
Since assuming the post as World Bank president, Paul Wolfowitz has highlighted 
corruption as a serious obstacle to development, elevating the issue to a World Bank 
priority.  However, some commentators view the World Bank itself as one cause of LDC 
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corruption because of its lending practices to poor countries in the past.  Many bank 
officials, at both the country level and in Washington, DC, were perfectly aware of Bank 
loans that were simply transferred into the accounts of dictators and their generals.  “A 
leaked 1997 World Bank report” found that as much as 20 to 30 percent of the budgets 
linked to development funds were embezzled and other reports attest to staff knowledge 
that fraud was going on and that Bank loans were not fostering economic development 
(Hurley, 2006).  Despite clear awareness by Bank officials that money would be diverted 
by corrupt elites, loans increased.  Most of these debts continue to be serviced today at 
the expense of essential investments by LDCs toward economic development and poverty 
reduction (Hurley).   
 
Exploiting development 
Norway is one of the first northern countries to recognize portions of developing 
country debt as illegitimate.  A Norwegian development program called the Shipping 
Export Credit Campaign involved the export of Norwegian ships to developing countries 
including Ecuador, Peru, and Jamaica between 1977 and 1980.  The ships were exported 
mainly to secure employment and avert a crisis in Norway’s ship-building industry.  In 
their agreements with Ecuadorian buyers, the Norwegian authorities demanded state 
guarantees.  When the buyers defaulted after four years, the Norwegians transferred 
remaining debt to Ecuador.  Presently, the value of the country’s debt is five times the 
original amount after 16 years of servicing.  Norway’s development minister said the 
lending was a “mistaken and damaging low point in Norway's development cooperation 
policy” (Hurley, 2006).  
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Measurement 
Myrdal (1970) devoted a book chapter to what he called “the opportunistic 
juggling of aid statistics” or the twisting of statistics to represent foreign aid as larger 
than it really is (Myrdal, p. 316).  The Organization For Economic Corporation and 
Development (OECD) include 30 rich and developed member nations.  OECD has a 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC).  The statistics assembled by DAC statistics 
on the disbursement of development assistance by its member governments are almost 
universally considered to be authoritative and are “relied upon uncritically by economists 
and other professional students of development problems” (p. 316).  Under the table 
heading “the flow of financial resources,” DAC statistics include all sorts of financial 
transfers, whether they have the character of aid or not.  This fact is regularly and 
systematically neglected when the figures are used.  The “mutation” by which DAC 
figures for financial flows become development assistance occurs in scholarly as well as 
popular writings and analyses (Myrdal, 1970).  Papaneck (1972) called discussion of the 
impact of foreign resources on LDC economic growth in early literature “curiously 
naïve” because of the unchallenged assumption that treated “aid” and “total resource 
inflow” “as though they were synonymous” (p. 934).  Myrdal charged that DAC has done 
little to prevent the “opportunistic misuse” of its figures and that the DAC practice of 
simply adding “private flows” to “official flows” supported neither clarity of thought nor 
honesty.  Private flows include a mixed bag of transactions from foreign direct 
investments (FDI) to export credits often tied to high-priced imports.  Similar 
transactions between developed countries would never be called aid.  
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An even more serious flaw in the DAC statistics on private flows is the definition 
of “net values” (Myrdal, 1970, p. 317).  Backflows from developing countries account for 
interest payments on outstanding loans and repatriated capital as reported to the 
governments of developed countries by their citizens and corporations.  Backflows do not 
include profits taken out of developing countries or capital flight—funds sent out of the 
country by LDC residents—but they do reckon the reinvested profits of foreign firms 
doing business in the country as part of private inflows.  Thus the DAC statistics which 
are deemed authoritative leave open the fundamental issue of whether there is really a net 
inflow at all to many LDCs instead of an outflow.  
The various international organizations including the United Nations observe an 
“interagency courtesy” of not questioning each others statistics and commonly accept 
each other’s figures without inquiries about the “meaning, relevance, or reliability” of the 
information (p. 320).  Myrdal calls the results of this polite regard “unethical from a 
professional point of view and in its effects decreases the scientific value” of the research 






The number of international organizations (IOs) has proliferated in the past half 
century.  Various political science theories explain the creation of IOs as a response to 
problems of efficiency and the desire of member states to improve their welfare.  The 
research resulting from these theories however, has paid little attention to how IOs 
actually behave after they are created.  Closer examination would reveal that many IOs 
stray from the effectiveness these theories impute and exercise power autonomously in 
ways unintended and unanticipated by their founders.  Barnett and Finnemore (1999) 
argue that the impersonal, generalized rules which define bureaucracies and make them 
powerful, also make IOs autonomous actors that are unresponsive to their primary 
missions.  Ultimately, power and autonomy leads to inefficient, self-defeating behavior. 
 
Theoretical basis for bureaucratic authority and autonomy 
Theorizing about organizations within social science is rooted in either economic 
or sociological assumptions.  The economistic approach views organizations as efficient 
solutions to market imperfections in which competition and exchange are the dominant 
features of organizational behavior.  The idea that IOs are created to serve state interests 
and continue to exist only because they fulfill these purposes is unquestioned.  In
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contrast, sociological approaches study organizations in a wider world of non-market 
situations that include issues of legitimacy and power.  Thus sociological assumptions 
more readily provide reasons why organizations that are not efficient or effective servants 
of member states might continue to receive support (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999).  The 
sociological basis for understanding organizational autonomy looks for kinds of power 
and sources of autonomy that economists overlook in the relationship of organizations to 
their environment (p. 703).  
Bureaucracies are created and supported in modern society for their effectiveness 
in carrying out social tasks.  Nonetheless folk wisdom views bureaucracy as inefficient 
and unresponsive.  Bureaucracies are infamous for creating policies and procedures that 
seem to defy logic, for refusing the requests of those to whom they are officially 
responsible, and for acting in ways that are at odds with their stated mission.  Yet 
international organizations are simply assumed to be responsive to state interests.  The 
crucial question of whether they actually do what they claim and accomplish their 
publicly stated missions is rarely investigated (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999).  
The view of international organizations as passive mechanisms without 
independent agendas is neither a reasonable assessment of their status nor is it borne out 
by research.  Beginning with the work of political economist Max Weber, sociologists 
have explored the idea that bureaucracy embodies certain values, distinct agendas, and 
behavioral dispositions that are bound up with power and social control in ways that can 
eclipse concerns about efficiency (Barnett & Finnemore, p. 709).  International 
organizations become autonomous sites of authority based on the legitimacy of the legal 
authority they embody and on their control over technical expertise and information.  In 
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contrast to earlier forms of authority that were invested in an individual leader, modern 
society deems the authority of bureaucracies as having greater legitimacy.   
Legitimate modern authority is vested with impersonal legalities, procedures, and 
rules.  The authority of bureaucracy is held to be “rational” because” it deploys 
knowledge recognized as socially relevant to create rules” (Barnett & Finnemore, p. 707).  
The autonomy of bureaucracy derives from its specialized technical knowledge, training, 
and experience that are unavailable to others.  Ironically, the authority and autonomy that 
make bureaucracies powerful create the appearance that they do not exercise power on 
their own behalf but only to serve others.  Weber acknowledged that the seemingly 
depoliticized character of bureaucracy “could be a myth” (Barnett & Finnemore, p. 708). 
 
Behaviors that undermine the stated goals of the bureaucracy 
Bureaucracies are established to accomplish collective goals.  The system in 
which they pursue these ends “create[s] a cultural disposition toward undesirable and 
ultimately self-defeating behavior” (Barnett & Finnemore, p. 718).  Two features are 
particularly important.  The first is simply the fact that bureaucracies are organized 
around rules, routines, and standard operating procedures.  Second, bureaucracies 
specialize and compartmentalize to create a division of labor that conserves individual 
time, knowledge, and expertise.  Both features can produce negative consequences.  Just 
as rules can eclipse goals, specialization can limit vision and create subcultures with 
viewpoints that are distinct from the larger environment.  The professional training 
transmits worldviews and normative commitments which affect behavior in unexpected 
ways especially when one kind of expertise is concentrated in an organization.   
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The nature and tendencies of bureaucracy make bureaucracy prone to certain 
kinds of behavior characterized by researchers Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore 
(1999) as pathological.  These inherent predispositions intensify within international 
organizations due to conditions of vague mission, weak feedback from the environment, 
and strong professionalism.  Five mechanisms of pathologies in international 
organizations follow.  First, the process of rationalization or rule-making taken to 
extremes becomes irrational as the rules and procedures by which bureaucracies function 
become ends in themselves.  Second, the attempt to manage numerous situations at once 
leads to universal rules and categories that “flattened genuine diversity” (Barnett & 
Finnemore).  Third, exceptions to organizational norms accumulate over time and 
become the new rule in a process that normalizes deviations from the norm.  These 
mechanisms result from bureaucracy’s defining feature as a structure of rules and 
procedures.  The last two mechanisms, in contrast, result from problems of poorly 
defined organizational mission, weak feedback from the environment, and lack of 
professionalism.  Organizations insulate themselves and develop internal cultures and 
world views counter to the goals and expectations they were created to serve as different 
local cultures developed within the organization with overlapping and contradictory 
preferences (Barnett & Finnemore).   
 
Bureaucracy as Domination 
In Weber on Bureaucracy: Management Consultant or Political Theorist? author 
Richard Weiss (1983) takes another approach on the power that authority and autonomy 
confer on bureaucratic power.  Weiss proposes that the generally accepted explanation of 
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Weber’s view on bureaucracy mutes some of the force of its implications.  Weiss argues 
that rather than concern with the difficulties of organizational efficiency or effectiveness 
Weber’s essays are most appropriately understood as “a theory of the character of a 
system of domination” (p. 243).  The central requisite of bureaucratic domination is the 
classic Weberian concept of “rational-legal legitimation” achieved through the popular 
perception that bureaucracy represents or is consistent with widely held values. 
Weber’s familiar categorization of traditional, charismatic, and rational legal 
authority are the three modes by which a system of domination stakes a claim to 
legitimacy; yet, it is the administrative staff that represents “most unambiguously the 
structure of domination: officialdom or bureaucracy” [quoted in (Weiss, p. 245)].  
Furthermore “bureaucratic administration means fundamentally domination through 
knowledge” (p. 245).  Foreign aid organizations are prime examples of a having 
legitimacy by representing widely held contemporary values, and by being perceived as 
effectively perform a unique service through the use of proprietary knowledge and 
expertise.  In reality, evidence and arguments generally unperceived by the public could 
support the opposite conclusion—that aid functions as a system of domination in LDCs 
that is contrary to modern values of justice and fair play. 
Understanding bureaucracy as domination rather than efficient organizational 
coordination implies a very different perspective of organizations as does the concept that 
legitimating ideas is the other crucial requisite of a system of domination.  Weber offers 
an ironic exception to the rule that bureaucratic administration essentially dominates 
through knowledge in the following quote.  Apparently entrepreneurs alone have the 
influence to resist domination of bureaucracy over persons. 
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“Superior to bureaucracy in the knowledge of techniques and facts is only the 
capitalist entrepreneur, within his own sphere of influence.  He is the only type 
who has been able to maintain at least relative immunity from subjection to the 
control of rational bureaucratic knowledge.  In large-scale organizations, all 
others are inevitably subject to bureaucratic control, just as they have fallen under 
the dominance of precision machinery and the mass production of goods (Weber, 
1968, p. 225)” (Weiss, p. 245).  
 
International Organizations 
International organizations are involved in the economic development process in 
several ways: they transfer real resources, offer technical assistance, give advice on 
development strategy, and collect and collate information (Krasner, 1968).  Specialized 
agencies and other United Nations bodies rely on subscriptions from the wealthy nations 
of the world to benefit the poor nations.  The UN system, World Bank, and International 
Monetary Fund act as financial intermediaries distributing resources between the 
developed world and least developed nations (LDCs).  The pattern of distribution of these 
resources is inevitably colored by the development strategy excepted by the governing 
body of the international organization involved.   
These organizations do not simply act as conduits passing aid from one group to 
another.  All international bodies implicitly support particular development strategies by 
spelling out the way in which real resources are to be used by the recipients or the way in 
which they are transferred by the donor.  While their recommendations “carry an aura of 
impartiality,” in many cases a governing body is more responsive to a particular 
constituency among its members (Krasner, p. 670).  The development strategies which 
IOs support are based upon economic assumptions which are not always favored by 
LDCs.  IOs act as surrogates for developed nations which dominate the decision-making 
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bodies.  Consequently, their policies reflect attitudes accepted by rich nations (Krasner, 
1968). 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was established after WWII with the 
hope that IOs would play a dominant role in creating a new international economic order.  
That expectation was not realized.  The problems of international commercial relations 
were dealt with largely by industrialized nations, leaving intergovernmental agencies to 
concern themselves almost exclusively with the problems of underdeveloped nations.  
“The IMF could ignore the problems of poor nations only at the risk of finding itself with 
little real purpose” (Krasner, p. 676). 
Krasner points to a basic conflict between the interests of the IMF and less 
developed nations.  The IMF, established before problems of economic development in 
LDCs were being seriously considered was designed for nations at the same relative stage 
of development.  Its fundamental assumptions may be less suitable in a world order of 
states at widely divergent stages of growth (Krasner).  In the debate over the amount and 
terms under which resources are transferred from rich to poor nations, international 
financial institutions have promoted “partisan ideas under the aura of international 
impartiality” (Krasner, p. 687).  LDCs are interested in more goods with fewer conditions 
through real trade reform—the abolition of tariff barriers on primary goods, in 
preferences by the industrial nations for LDC manufacturers, and in commodity 
agreements for primary products.  The mechanism of export earnings for LDCs transfer 
more resources than foreign aid will and help to end the “supplicant-beneficiary 
relationship which taints bilateral assistance programs” regardless of their magnanimity 






To explore how imperialistic attitudes are manifested in the structure of foreign 
aid and the consequences of those attitudes, the mechanism of imperialism itself must 
first be understood.  The ideological justifications on behalf of imperialism, the motives 
that put it in place,  as well as the conditions that perpetuate it once established are key to 
understanding how imperialism can be carried out with tools other than the traditional 
military force associated with imperialism in the minds of most people.  The imperialism 
established by nations of western society that flourished under colonialism has parallels 
today in the global economic system and accomplishes with the monetary system what 
was formerly achieved through direct force.  Foreign aid and international organizations 
are an integral part of this new imperialism. 
The term “imperialism” was coined in France and introduced into English in 
the19th-century as an allusion to Napoleon Bonaparte.  The term “imperialism régime” 
was meant to describe “a great deal of power held by a central authority, with a 
corresponding decline of liberty” (Morgenbesser, 1973, p. 4).  The term has a rich history 
and according to reputable historians has changed meanings more than a dozen times.  
There is an important distinction between imperialism and empire.  For example, 
“imperialistic” may apply to the action taken by a country even though it does not 
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indicate “the intention of the country to acquire an empire or result in helping to build 
one” (Morgenbesser, p. 10).  When the thirteen ex-colonies in America became unified, 
the result was called an empire, but none of the states dominated the others.  On the other 
hand princes, emperors, and people not organized as states may try to build empires.  A 
corporation, rather than a state, can act imperialistically without being or trying to 
develop an empire. 
“The term imperialism describes a particular kind of reality, even though it is not 
the kind that can be statistically weighed and measured.  What it denotes is a 
relationship: specifically the relationship of a ruling or controlling power to those 
under its dominion.  (George Lichtheim, Imperialism (New York, 1971), p. 4)” 
[quoted in (Morgenbesser, p. 11)]. 
 
Imperialism can apply to nations, corporations, and individuals.  Can the actions 
of international organizations be imperialistic as well?  The critique of American foreign 
policy in recent years as “aggressive, coercive, predatory, and imperialistic” has also 
been said about the aid policies of the IMF, World Bank, and other international agencies 
(Morgenbesser, p. 10).  Rather that attempting to define imperialism, author Sidney 
Morgenbesser (1973), in Imperialism: Some Preliminary Distinctions, proposed a set of 
sufficient conditions for describing imperialism.  He applied his model to evaluating 
overseas investing corporations whose heavy investments in economically 
underdeveloped countries resemble some of the results of colonization.  A modified 
version of the model could be used to judge the actions of bilateral and multilateral 
international organizations that essentially perform a function comparable to corporations 
in providing investment capital for development.  Assume that we treat all international 
aid agencies of the advanced nations S as entity IO, and then we may say: 
 I/O is imperialistic in U if (but [and] only if) 
1. U is a weak state, and IO is economically powerful. 
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2. IO pursues policies K that are not beneficial for U 
3. Policies K accentuate unjust distribution of economic and political power 
in U, and between U and S.   
4. IO would not opt for K unless the benefits to IO outweigh the costs to IO 
as perceived by IO 
5. IO dominates the modern sector of the economy of U.  Citizens of U have 
inferior jobs in the industries or companies financed by IO. 
Policy K may also be considered imperialistic (Morgenbesser, 1973, p. 23). 
 
Based on this model, some actions of international development organization may 
indeed be considered imperialistic.  Cases of annexation and colonization were 
denounced on the moral grounds that foreign rule and domination without the assent of 
the governed violate their rights to national self-determination.  Domination treats 
indigenous culture as inferior, provides economic advantage for elite enclaves that hurts 
the economy of the colonized, and accentuates the unequal distribution of wealth and 
political power between states (p. 16).  Colonialism and imperialism humiliate their 
victims and diminish their chances of becoming viable nations with pride in their cultures.  
Leader of the People’s Republic of China, Mao Tse-tung, once remarked to a delegation 
of French Algerian nationalists, “the bond that unites us, is that we have both been 
humiliated” [quoted in (Morgenbesser, p. 15)]   
“More than anything, more even than the enormous material costs of imperialism; 
it was the imposition of inferior social, and moral status that shaped the reaction 
of the Egyptian to the European.  Actually, the one implies the other: material 
exploitation is difficult if not impossible without the sanction of a double set of 
values and a corresponding double code of behavior... the fact remains, however, 
that in the many-sided impact of imperialism, it is the injury to self-respect that 
hurts the most, it is the resentment aroused by spiritual humiliation that gives rise 
to an irrational response to rational exploitation.  The apparently unreasonable, 
and certainly unprofitable, resistance of many of the world's underdeveloped 
countries today to Western business enterprise makes sense only in this context” 
(David S. Landes, Bankers and Pashas [Cambridge, Mass., 1958], p. 323) [quoted 
in Morgenbesser, 15). 
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British philosopher and political economist John Stuart Mill wrote in 1874 that it 
was “a grave error” “to suppose that the same international customs and the same rules of 
international morality, can obtain between one civilized nation and another, and between 
civilized nations and barbarians”[quoted in (Morgenbesser, p. 13)].  Mill's words sound 
strange in the 21st-century, but the sensibilities that informed his 19th century mindset 
are embarrassingly resonant in the logic of foreign aid conditionality.  Mill reasoned that 
the same rules cannot be applicable because: 
In the first place, the rules of ordinary international morality imply reciprocity.  
But barbarians will not reciprocate.  They cannot be depended on for observing 
any rules.  Their minds are not capable of so great an effort nor their wills 
sufficiently under the influence of distant motives.  In the next place, nations 
which are still barbarous have not got beyond the period during which it is likely 
to be for their benefit that they should be conquered and held in subjection by 
foreigners.  Independence and nationality, so essential to the due growth and 
development of the people further advanced in improvement, are generally 
impediments to theirs.  The sacred duties which civilized nations owe to the 
Independence and nationality of each other are not binding toward those to whom 
nationality and Independence are either a certain evil or at best a questionable 
good (John Stuart Mill, Dissertations and Discussions: Political, Philosophical, 
and Historical, III, [New York, 1874], pp. 252-253) quoted in (Morgenbesser, p. 
14). 
 
These comments are remarkable not because they reflect the prejudices and 
attitudes of a century and a half ago but because they appear to parallel implications of 
the contemporary foreign aid regime.  While in a 21st century context the quote is not 
politically correct, the substance of Mill's reasoning is quite analogous to current postures 
of international financial institutions toward LDCs.  Political theorist Hannah Arendt 
argues concerning national self-determination in relation to international organizations:  
No nation state could with a clear conscience ever try to conquer foreign peoples, 
since such a conscience comes only from the conviction of the conquering nation 
that, it is imposing a superior law upon barbarians.  The nation, however, 
conceived of its laws as an outgrowth of a unique national substance which is not 
valid beyond its own people in the boundaries of its own territory.  Wherever the 
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nation-state appeared as conqueror, it aroused national consciousness and desire 
for sovereignty among the conquered people [quoted in (Morgenbesser, p. 14)]. 
 
The term economic imperialism represents a point of view that modern foreign 
and colonial policies obey the dictates of capitalist interests.  Marx said,  
If the free traders cannot understand how one nation can grow rich at the expense 
of another we need not wonder, since the same gentlemen also refuse to 
understand how within one country one class can enrich itself at the expense of 
another, [Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy (Moscow, n. d.), p. 223] quoted 
in (Morgenbesser, p. 26).   
 
Some argue that governments and national economies did not benefit from empire, 
but profits did accrue to specific groups within the imperialistic country.  In these 
groups—the capitalists, industrialists, and the bankers—control the levers of political 
power.  Likewise, neo-imperialism does not depend upon formal political domination.  
“It can be implemented through international organizations such as the International 
Monetary Fund which may act as the colonial administration entrusted with the 
responsibility of enforcing the rules of the game” (Dorner, 1973, p. 347). 
Aid as Imperialism, by Teresa Hayter (1971) is a liberal critique of aid policies 
that attempted to expose the inconsistencies and conflicting motivations of international 
financial institutions.  Her 1971 study concerned their efforts to influence general 
economic policies in developing countries.  Hayter proposed simply that if the idea of 
conditionality was to be generally accepted by aid providers, it should be more carefully 
examined.  She argued that the “leverage” that was becoming quietly accepted policy at 
the time went beyond influence and persuasion to condition aid, explicitly or implicitly, 
on specific host country action.  According to Hayter, when she was a staff member of 
the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), an independent non-government body seeking 
to ensure wise action in the field of development, the possibility of aid as “merely the 
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smooth face of imperialism” was not even considered among the research staff (Hayter, p. 
7).  They basically assumed aid was good and that its major objective was the well being 
of Third World peoples. 
In Foreign Aid – A Critique and a Proposal, A. O. Hirschman (1968) and co-
author R.M. Byrd discuss some of the disadvantages of the program aid approach as it 
relates to the diplomacy of the aid process.  Program aid is usually given in connection 
with conditionality on the central economic policies of the recipient.  The implication of 
superior knowledge by donors on the matters that are typically the subject of negotiations 
can prove highly irritating to the recipient.  Furthermore, a country that allows its 
economic policy to be decided by international agencies finds itself in “a semi-colonial 
situation” and is likely to engage in indirect resistance.  Additionally, the nature of the aid 
relationship commonly entails a gap in the respective levels or ranks of those who 
actually negotiate between donor and recipient that can be irksomely wide.  Hirschman 
argues that program aid creates resentment by re-erecting a typical colonial situation in 
which the recipient country leadership have to deal as equals with, and often feel that 
they have to take orders from personnel, who “within their own country are miles away 
from the seat of power” (p. 13).   
C. Montrie (1973), from the Agency for International Development (AID) 
responded to the appraisal in a journal article “The Organization and Function of Foreign 
Aid” , stating:  
If country officials feel that they are caught in the colonial situation, they are 
more likely misinterpreting the meaning of their political, economic, or merely 
financial insolvency.  If they are helpless, it is most likely because the country’s 
policies or politics have made them so.  The manners and rank of aid officials 
they are forced to turn to are distinctly a secondary problem.  There are worse 
problems than personal resentment (p. 703). 
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The tenor of his comment underscores Hirschman’s argument that donor attitudes 
provoke recipient resentment as do the following remarks: “those officials who are forced 
into [change] might even be happy to do it,” and “the complaining opposition secretly 
might be pleased to get the nastier job done before it has to take power” 
The benefactor supplicant relationship that aid engenders is a serious concern that 
cannot be dismissed lightly.  Myrdal called the aid policies of developed countries toward 
underdeveloped countries a crucial political problem that at bottom was a moral issue.  
“The primordial problem is how people in the developed countries think and feel about 
helping under developed countries in their development efforts” (Myrdal, 1970, p. 310). 
The attitudes within the international organizations manifested by current policies 
of conditionality toward developing countries have historical roots.  In 1956, then U. N. 
Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold initially suggested the establishment of a United 
Nations “international administrative service” to address the shortage of trained public 
officials in underdeveloped areas.  He believed that unless personnel from outside these 
countries were secured, their development plans would be seriously impaired during the 
crucial “take-off” period.   
Hammarskjold envisioned a pool of highly competent administrators recruited on 
an international basis, who possessed the influence and authority to implement their own 
recommendations, pending the gradual training of national officials capable of replacing 
them.  The gist of the plan was for foreign administrators to gain maximum integration 
into LDC governments while retaining their international status.  In Considerations on 
International Administrative Service (1959), author Georges D. Landau acknowledged 
that finding an historical instance “quite coincident” with the Secretary-General's 
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proposals of international agents administering the affairs of sovereign nations would be 
difficult (Landau, p. 49).   
Nevertheless, the proposed UN solution to “the dearth of native officials that 
could be entrusted with [development] programs” in most underdeveloped countries was 
to graft experienced foreign functionaries recruited through United Nation’s sponsorship 
into these “incipient administrations” (pp. 56, 57).  It would be unfair to anachronistically 
apply current values and attitudes to ideas expressed over forty years ago.  In any case, 
these statements convey astonishing hubris even for the context of 1959. 
Between 1951 and 1952, the Bolivian government acceded to UN experts and 
agreed to appoint foreign administrators to specific posts of “influence and authority” 
within the country's administration.  The experiment was a short-lived.  Political unrest 
and a subsequent uprising in 1952 brought a new president to power who revised the 
arrangement.  The new Bolivian leader declared that allowing foreign personnel to have 
executive decision-making authority in the country’s administration was “incompatible 
with national sovereignty” (p. 50).  A UN official described Bolivia’s experiment as 
“surely not… an unmitigated success in every respect” (p. 56). 
For some time prior to 1956, the UN Technical Assistance Administration 
(UNTAA) had provided assistance to LDCs that focused on the procedural aspects of 
public administration that were essential for implementing policy—budgeting, finance, 
personnel management, organization and methods, procurement, and documentation—
instrumental to smooth government operations.  The International Administrative Service, 
however, aimed to place foreign experts in charge at the highest and intermediate levels 
of government hierarchy in LDCs both in procedural and substantive operations.  
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According to the UN Secretary-General, his plan was a response to the urgent need LDCs 
felt for competent administrative personnel proficient enough to handle “the cumbersome 
machinery state” until local administrators could acquire the necessary know-how to 
assume its management themselves.  The Secretary-General estimated that process would 
require a generation (Landau, pp. 49, 55). 
The claim that LDC governments were eagerly seeking a program of UN 
provided leaders that was “certain to evoke a warm response” was not born out by the 
responses of LDC leaders.  When the draft proposal came before the Assembly Council 
(TAC) the response to the idea of “alien personnel” was overwhelmingly unfavorable (p. 
56).  Reactions ranged from hesitation and reluctance to outright denunciation calling the 
plan a channel of “neo-imperialism” (p. 57)  In addition to grave misgivings about the 
capacity of foreign administrative generalists to understand their societies and make 
satisfying plans for their countries, the very notion of entrusting agents of an international 
organization with executive powers within their states “frontally collided” with the 
fundamental principles of nonintervention by the UN in the internal affairs of member 
nations (Landau, p. 57).  Such intervention was deemed inexcusable even on the grounds 
that the state itself requested the intrusion, perhaps after some insistent UN prodding.  
Schemes recommending the employment of international personnel to implement 
LDC development date back to 1949.  These proposals were chiefly concerned with 
modes of financing economic development plans but also called for the provision of 
technical and scientific experts.  The International Administrative Service, however, 
embodied more than technical assistance.  It envisioned a nucleus of international experts 
composed of both professional officials and specialists.  Appointment to this elite cadre 
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would be reserved for only a small quota of the total number of experts employed by the 
participating UN organizations and would expire when the holder reached age sixty.   
There were several problems at the time of recruiting administrators from the “top 
echelons of the administrative hierarchy including the scarcity of available personnel, the 
likelihood that available personnel would be of mature age, and the probability they 
would come from former colonial administrations.  The proposal did not address itself to 
the possible source of such a pool of high-ranking, experienced, and versatile 
international administrators.  Furthermore, their relationship with the host government 
would be of a privileged contractual nature with substantially better pay than ordinary 
officials—creating circumstances ripe for resentment on the part of collateral and 
subordinate officials of host government, thus limiting the cooperation that would be 
expected.  The value and prestige of experienced elderly functionaries would be offset by 
a range of problems of adapting to new environments. 
A key feature of the United Nations plan for foreign administrators is their 
employment by the host country as members of their civil service raising legal questions 
in addition to issues of effective integration into the country's public service.  According 
to the International Administrative Service plan, in addition to their function as heads of 
executive branches, foreign administrators were to train local officials through 
establishing appropriate institutions as well as in-service training.  Landau (1959) 
proposed adapting the plan by posting promising young experts in public administration 
trained under international auspices to technical assistance missions.  This raises the 
obvious solution of simply training country nationals who would learn by doing and from 
making their own mistakes, a prerogative to which development status entitles them. 
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In addition to the UN recommendation for career executives, there was a 
characteristic UN proposal to establish a brain-trust and clearinghouse for information at 
headquarters.  Landau (1959) regarded these knowledge activities as the outstanding 
feature of the scheme.  The contemplated arrangement contrasted with other 
recommendations for a small clearinghouse at the regional level.  This reference service 
was to resemble the U. S. International Cooperation Administration (ICA) with “an 
organizational chart of dual relationship between functional offices and regional 
directorates” (p. 66).  The author admitted that a less elaborate apparatus could be 
accommodated within UNTAA.  The recommendation for a clearinghouse of information 
illustrates the typical UN preference that avoids the practical for the grandiose ignoring 
the concept that increasing the size of bureaucracy increases inefficiency and costs. 
An alternative program model operated through the Institute of Inter-American 
Affairs (IIAA) was known commonly as Servicios.  These semiautonomous units were 
set up by mutual agreement in bilateral partnership with the U. S. to foster the economic 
and social development of the host country.  The purpose of the cooperative undertaking 
was to train nationals to take over responsibility as early as possible.  Semiautonomous 
operating units are headed by a national director and a US co-director who have effective 
mutual veto power.  The assisting American co-director was responsible to the 
appropriate state minister of the host government and to his own superiors in the U. S. 
Government.  The units were endowed with power to manage services on the ground—
personnel, bank accounts, administrative procedures—and there were no two identical 
services; each country service was established ad hoc. The US assistants were by and 
large people of demonstrated competence.   
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While the program is not without problems, the advantages of the system were 
numerous, the primary one being provision was made for training local officials in the 
actual operation of projects.  The structure was versatile and the “functional mimetic” 
extended beyond operations to the economic planning phase proper.  The focus of 
Servicios was hands-on training of nationals versus bureaucratic oversight proposed by 
the International Service Administration.  The program model was being introduced in 
five Middle Eastern countries by request, and several Asian countries were examining the 
program with interest.   
Remarkably, Landau (1959) concludes that these programs, conducted on a 
bilateral basis, could be run more optimally by international organizations because the 
neutral character of multilaterals would make them more palatable to governments that 
might otherwise resent intrusion of foreign administrators.  In an even more remarkable 
display of complete indifference to expressed LDC opposition and sensibilities, the 
author expresses hope that “narrow minded... nationalistic excesses” will not hinder 
progress in developing the “Executive Operations Service” (p. 68). 
Landau's remarkable conclusions illustrate part of the problem with thinking and 
attitudes of international organizations.  He overlooks the obvious fact that countries 
themselves were requesting the Servicios program because they found it a successful 
coequal partnership between host nationals and assisting country personnel, in contrast to 
the UN International Service Administration proposal.  The program provided 
autonomously flexible management without imposing a humiliating hierarchy.  It focused 
on partnership and training nationals to take charge rather than putting foreigners in 
charge. 
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International Financial Institutions 
The World Bank's perspective towers.  Its funds, publications, and professionals 
dominate.  “If the bank merely represented abstract reasoning, it could be ignored, but the 
programs IFIs [international financial institutions] imposed on African countries have 
consequences for national sovereignty, economic development, and human well-being” 
(Riddell, 1995, p. 260).  From the perspective of the majority of African citizens, the 
bank has mis-specified African economic reality and its “prescriptions will kill rather 
than cure the patient” (p. 262).  
The political economy of African nations has changed.  In the 1960s and 1970s 
the State was the key actor attempted to overcome colonialism and combat 
neocolonialism.  By the late 1970s, the local state's role was gradually preempted by IFIs 
in the global economy.  The African State became less and less able to deliver services 
during the 1980s and 1990s, economies withered and the cost-of-living soared.  The bank 
operated by rules of international economics and a simplistic understanding of how the 
African state operates.  Consequently, the bank model of the role of the state in the 
economy was incorrect for many African countries.   
Inappropriate model specification leads to false conclusions.  The bank's unit of 
analysis is countries, but “people live at the micro level, where the facts of starvation, 
sickness, death, poverty, ignorance, and economic failure dominate—where the world has 
“fallen apart as another wave of imperialism hits the African shores, this time led not by 
colonialism, but by the “magic” of the market (with the bank and the IMF as facilitators)” 
(Riddell, p. 264). 
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The centrality of the state is apparent, but the Bank has weakened African states 
through conditions that diminish their economic role even while it needs a strong state to 
enforce those conditions.  In most countries some combination of uncaring, corrupt, inept, 
repressive, and unaccountable leadership has replaced democracy.  Since the Berg Report 
in 1981, reams of Bank-produced documents state the need for Africa to adjust.  They 
have been countered in kind by criticism of the Bank's mindset and policies, criticism that 
has been ignored.  Instead, the Bank behaves like “an organized and bureaucratized 
religious body” that alone knows the truth.  Besides, it has the power and the money.  
Meanwhile the people of Africa suffer.  “Indeed, fifty years is enough” (Riddell, p. 264). 
Structural adjustments have become the source of a power struggle between the 
institutions established at Bretton Woods and African leaders.  I agree with Prempeh 
(2001) in his article “The Politics of One-Sided Adjustment in Africa: A Response to 
Professor Osabu-Kle” that African leaders must throw off the narrow dependency debate 
and gain new insights, or otherwise risk redundancy and adding very little that is new to 
the current debate.  Osei Kwadwo E. Prempeh, assistant professor of political science at 
Carleton University argues that the most powerful western states champion adjustments 
to satisfy their own interests and that the lack of accountability in the Bretton Woods 
institutions  raises the issue of good governance.  He believes that transnational civil 
society must seek a more consistent and systematic way to press the issue of good 
governance on IFIs.  The issue of adjustments exposes a global governance problem 
within the IFIs and questions of accountability, representative democracy, transparency, 
and global distributive justice.  The issue of adjustments needs to be situated within 
questions about the functioning and legitimacy of IFIs.  The prevalent notion of the 
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superiority of recommended structural adjustments to other alternatives has to be 
challenged (Prempeh, p. 566).   
Some theorists attribute Africa's economic crisis to misguided state interventions 
in the market.  Allowing markets to operate freely, emphasizing markets in trade 
liberalization, and attention to macroeconomic indicators is the recommended solution.  
Adjustment as at heart a political power struggle (Prempeh, 2001).  The short term 
prescriptions of the IFIs have been inappropriate and one-sided, with negligible impact in 
improving African economies.  African populations have been compelled to undergo 
suffering that achieved very little.  There's not much evidence suggesting that adjustment 
fosters policy reform and economic growth.  Countries that do not accept the IFIs bitter 
medicine are subject to punitive sanctions that will necessarily affect their economic 
performance. 
International financial institutions embody a double standard in the assumption 
that a politically distorted world market deeply characterized by protectionism is an arena 
for setting the right prices.  Their eyes are closed to market failures in the West that 
encourage western governments to institute welfare benefits.  IFIs compel African states 
to remove all government subsidies and expose African populations to untold hardship 
and marginalization.  Meanwhile, they ignore the hypocrisy of national subsidies to 
western farmers, monopolies, oligopolies, welfare and unemployment benefits, and 
protectionist barriers; all of these are measures based on political decisions that distort 
both labor and commodity markets (Prempeh, 2001).   
Western nations practice trade protectionism and use monetary and fiscal policy 
to defend their national interest.  But only the neoliberal agenda is recommended for poor 
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African states.  IFIs urge countries to privatize, but in most cases enterprises are sold off 
to foreign buyers with very little domestic ownership and unless the government reverses 
its current privatization policy, the economy will be dominated by a small cabal or cartel 
of insiders and their foreign and domestic cronies.  According to the prevailing orthodoxy, 
the theory of comparative advantage and unbridled free trade is supported by newly 
industrialized states of Southeast Asia.  This interpretation of the newly industrializing 
country’s (NIC) experience is not supported by evidence.  The Asian Tiger’s relative 
success came about through more, not less government intervention (Prempeh, p. 571). 
African elites champion the alternative self-reliance framed around the need to 
question the neocolonial nature of the economy by deemphasizing its export orientation, 
and starting to produce more items dictated by internal needs.  They claim that African 
development should be guided by African values to ensure that the development process 
is internally generated and sustained.  However, this alternative underestimates the 
contradictions within and between African states, and most critically, it still depends on 
transfers of financial resources and technological know-how from developed countries, 
and fails to address the politics of its implementation.  Essentially, the alternative relies 
on external financial resources to finance a counter-hegemonic project.  Furthermore the 
interests of so called “benign African elite” are at odds with those of the masses, and 
conditioned by their own class interests.  Many African leaders risk deemphasizing the 
real inequalities, differences, and lack of political will that persists among African leaders.  
Prempeh argues that the fundamental question is how to include new voices in the 
emerging debate over alternatives on a transnational basis to challenge the neoliberal 
project of the IFIs. 
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I argue that trying to reform the ills inherent in bureaucracy would be a futile 
endeavor.  There was no history of trying to reform autocratic rule except as a transition 
to some other kind of rule.  Control and domination based on autonomy and power can 
only be transformed.  Bureaucracy can be reformed only by a process of transformation 
to some other kind of rule.  Another mechanism must be found for performing the useful 
tasks with which bureaucratic management interferes. 
Two issues central to Africa's economic recovery are progress of local 
organization to empower communities to oppose neoliberal economic order and alliances 
with progressive forces worldwide to demand reform of IFIs in line with good 
governance.  I argue it will be ineffective to call for organizations to reform that already 
possess power and autonomy based on their perceived consistency with widely held 
foreign aid development values, and the fiction that they are apolitical.  Their 
legitimation is not based on ideals of accountability, transparency etc., it is based on 
domination through knowledge and expertise. 
Again Prempeh insists that at the root of this approach is the design for a world 
financial system that is more balanced, accountable, and participatory and less tilted to 
the interests of big business in rich nations.  Prempeh quotes writer Noam Chomsky 
commenting on the Seattle protest during the 2000World Trade Organization summit.  
The event was significant because constituencies rarely interrelated in the past came 
together in opposition. 
Those thinking about the issues ranged from being disturbed to being strongly 
opposed to them, primarily to the sharp attack on democratic rights, on the 
freedom to make your own decisions and on the general subordination of all 
concerns to the primacy of maximizing profits and domination by a very small 
sector of the world's population.  If the popular reaction in this case takes an 
organized, constructive form, it can reverse the undemocratic thrust of the 
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international economic arrangements being foisted on the world [quoted in 
(Prempeh, p. 578)]. 
 
The politics of adjustment is situated in the historical context of the evolving 
African history of slavery, continued economic weakness, and the subordinate role of 
African countries within imperialism and neocolonialism.  However, discussions of 
adjustment can no longer be confined to African states and their elites.  There is a role for 
domestic and transnational civil society, in transcending the dynamics of power and 
inequality.  The debate must be truly inclusive, incorporating the voices of the affected 





The RALFIS Evaluation Report 
In 1996, a three person mission evaluated the UNIDO sponsored Regional Africa 
Leather and Footwear Industry Scheme (RALFIS).  Based on field visits to four of the ten 
participating countries in Eastern and Southern Africa, the mission concluded that 
RALFIS had addressed the development needs of the target beneficiaries of the program 
including institutions, industrial companies, and extension services for hides and skins.  
The team further determined that the UNIDO input of experts, training, and equipment 
had been managed efficiently and with few complaints concerning quality.  Closer 
inspection of the 157 page document (UNIDO, 1997), however, revealed information and 
observations that provide grounds for disputing these claims.  Evidence of the major 
criticisms leveled at IO-sponsored development efforts surfaced in the report including 
overpriced inputs as a result of aid tying, inefficient use of manpower, preference for 
expatriate experts over national and local experts, remote management, tied procurement 
leading to unsuitable, overpriced equipment, little sustainable transfer of knowledge and 
skills, condescending attitudes among international experts, focus on top down 
management, and disinterest in broad-based development. 
The first phase of the Africa leather program was conceived at a UNIDO 
consultation on leather in Innsbruck, Austria, in 1984.  A description of the meeting  
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revealed that no donor funds were mobilized and therefore the program could not be 
implemented.  There was no mention however of any representation or input from the 
African leather industry into the project.  Phase 1 was considered the pilot scheme, and 
was eventually implemented between 1989 and 1992 for approximately $13 million.  
Phase 1 focused on raw materials and semi-processed leather products; but a financial 
incentive and a grading system was not implemented due to the costs involved and a 
change of priorities (UNIDO, p. 16), even though price level is “the key factor 
influencing the quantity of the collected hides and skins” (p. 42).   
The program management mobilized a budget of $10.6 million for Phase 2.  
Phase 2 emphasized leather finishing, effluent treatment, and manufacture of footwear 
and leather products.  Neither Phase 1 nor Phase 2 dealt with rural tanning ostensibly due 
to its limited importance in the participating countries.  However, it was duly noted that 
program officials did not wish to promote rural tanning because it would not employ 
industrial processes and effluent control” (UNIDO, p. 15).  Missing from the logic was 
the often repeated objective of reducing poverty by supporting rural enterprises in the 
leather supply chain.  Ecological concerns overrode the stated economic goals of the 
program. 
Before analyzing the RALFIS mission report, by way of context and to draw an 
analogy, I will consider three necessary conditions that growth theories incorporate 
regarding markets, entrepreneurs, and capital.  In Theories of Economic Growth and 
Development: Methodology and Content, author Sherman Robinson (1972) states these 
conditions.  In order for economic growth to occur: 
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1) Profitable opportunities must exist for producing outputs whose value exceeds 
that of the inputs—the definition of growth; 
2) Individuals or groups with the information and motivation to exploit the 
profitable opportunities must exist; 
3) Capital to exploit the profitable opportunities must exist and individuals must 
be able to divert adequate resources to exploit the potential innovation.  
An analogous foreign aid pattern—Model A—leading to growth would be:  
1) Donor initiated programs assist recipient to exploit development opportunities;  
2) Aid provided foreign experts assist recipients to exploit development 
opportunities; 
3) Aid provided resources of tied goods assist recipients to exploit development 
opportunities.   
Whether or not these conditions are really equal to what growth theories predict will 
result in satisfactory growth is one question.  Another even more pertinent question is 
whether these conditions are the ones that actually occur in aid assisted development.  
Suppose that rather than development per se, the aspiration for development is the 
profitable opportunity, and that development programs themselves rather than successful 
development outcomes are the output of aid assisted development.  Then the growth 
paradigm—Model B--could be expressed as follows:  
1) Development aspirations are profitable opportunities for initiating programs 
whose overall value—in absorbing surplus capacity and supporting donor 
industries—exceeds that of the inputs of foreign aid funding including TA and 
tied goods; 
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2) Development experts are available with information and motivation—salaries 
and benefits far in excess of market rates—to exploit the profitable opportunities; 
3) Excess financial capital and surplus industrial goods as foreign aid sources can 
be diverted to exploit the profitable opportunities of development aspirations. 
Model B offers a plausible explanation for some puzzling features of much 
foreign aid, such as the limited development results that have gone uninvestigated and 
continued donors funding in the face of seeming aid ineffectiveness.  Why do ineffective 
development programs and the agencies that produce them go on proliferating?  Donors 
fund selected programs ostensibly justified by recipient development needs, but in reality 
program inputs of TA and tied goods that reflect donor comparative advantage in reality 
suppress recipient development.  Often program outputs do not profit the recipient and 
are unrelated to their development needs.  On the one hand development failure, usually 
attributed to recipient limitations, justifies and necessitates further donor involvement, 
thus expanding profitable opportunities for future programs.  On the other hand, donors 
are accountable to no one for successfully fulfilling or not achieving development 
objectives. 
Robinson’s growth scheme implies that national entrepreneurs should be the 
primary actors in LDC development.  In reality, donor selected experts are the primary 
actors in aid promoted development programs.  Model B implies that expatriate will be 
the primary actors in spearheading development programs and activity.  If Model B is 
genuinely at work, three additional predictions should hold:  
1) Donor priorities will have precedence over recipient priorities;  
2) Program priorities will have precedence over the development priorities; and  
66
3) Priorities of foreign personnel will have precedence over country national 
priorities.   
The remainder of this chapter analyzes the RALFIS evaluation report in two 
ways: 1) contrasting the stated achievements in the opening summary with actual results 
stated elsewhere in the report; and 2) numbering each item in the summary and assigning 
it to a category in Figures 4a and 4b of “Achieved Priorities” and “Unachieved Priorities” 
for donors or recipients, program or development, expatriates or nationals.  If a summary 
achievement placed in Figure 4a is contradicted later in the report, then the bolded 
number is repeated in Figure 4b. 
 
Summary of Achievements 
1. Good results in rehabilitating tanneries and establishing effluent treatment plants  
2. Good results achieved in supporting gender issues were addressed intensely in 
training women, and promoting female professionals  
3. Increased availability of locally produced finished leather of good quality 
4. Upgraded quality of shoes produced in some companies (10 countries supported 
by the program produce approximately 15 million pairs of shoes (p. 12) 
5. Pioneering accomplishment of exported shoes though quantity and value are 
modest (in some leather companies the impact was rather marginal) 
6. Efficiency, effectiveness, and impact of the program input-output linkages and 
synergy 
7. Less evident results in generating new job opportunities for women 
8. Less satisfactory improvement in skins and hides  
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9. Significant impact will occur in the elimination of effluents once all the plants are 
fully operational.  The efficiency will be comparable to European standards 
10. None of the supported institutions achieved sustainability in financial terms 
11. Repayment discipline needs to be improved  
12. Did not implement a financial incentive and grading system (p. 15) 
13. Systematic training for the local counterparts and national experts in UNIDO in 
the UNDP was not conducted (p. 16) 
14. Unsuccessful promotion of industrial cooperation with overseas partners (p. 16)  
15. Lack of follow-up was due to the costs involved, changes in priorities, or factors 
beyond the program management control (p. 16) 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
16. Good results achieved thanks to a stable core of competent experts and the 
devotion of the program management.  The program merits funding and 
continuation 
17. Pay greater attention to activities at the policy level for cleaner production and 
solid waste management 
18. Downplay program involvement in the construction of slaughtering slabs and 
sheds, and focus rather on policy advice and training  
 
Key industry factors 
The core of the leather industry is represented by the following sub-sectors: raw 
hides and skins production, collection, and commercialization tanning and leather 
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finishing manufacturing leather products: footwear and other leather products.  The 
foremost difficulty facing the leather industry is the problem of skins and hides including 
low off-what take rate, damaged hides, and skins due to disease, brand marks, and ground 
drying (UNIDO, p. 12).  This single fact is repeated in reports over the last 20 years.   
 
Technical Assistance 
Most of the experts were recruited from overseas and consulted on a “roving 
basis” in more than one country shortening their stays at some companies to the regret of 
target beneficiaries.  In general, beneficiaries were satisfied with the competence of the 
experts and the quality of their work.  In a few cases “the expert’s advice on effluent 
treatment might not have been properly articulated to be absorbed easily” (UNIDO, p. 
19).  Some African experts were employed.  “This practice turned out to be both efficient 
and effective and should be extended” (p. 19). 
 
Training 
One hundred forty-two people participated in fellowships and study tours and 
foreign trade fairs.  Five individuals were involved in two events.  Most training took 
place in Kenya, Italy (19), Zimbabwe (12), Germany (11), and Ethiopia (10).  Training 
cost was less than ten percent of the RALFIS program budget (Appendix Table 5). 
 
Tying Procurement 
Equipment accounts for 34% of all expenditures.  A significant portion was used 
to establish effluent treatment plants that benefited four tanneries.  The mission found the 
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percentage of funds allocated to effluent treatment plants (ETP) “out of balance with 
other objectives” (p. 20).  While most of the equipment was in use or under installation, 
the mission recognized there was no guarantee the delivered equipment would be used.  
Small entrepreneurs had problems either installing the equipment or making full use of its 
capacity.  The mission report declared this was due in most cases to factors “beyond the 
control of program management” for example, customs clearance.  In one case, effluent 
treatment equipment provided by the project was installed on time, but the beneficiary 
allowed the installed ETP equipment to be “idle for more than two years” (p. 20).  
Program related problems included delivering equipment to the wrong beneficiary, and 
selecting equipment unsuitable to the entrepreneurs’ requirements.  For example, 
obtaining new machines from the same manufacturer of machines already in the fleet 
facilitates maintenance and access to spare parts.   
One entrepreneur considered the machines provided by the program too expensive 
an investment.  This transaction involved equipment costing $84,000.  The mission 
evaluated the situation as follows: A lesson should be learned from this experience: the 
selection of material must be done in full consultation with the target beneficiary and 
with due consideration of its technical, infrastructural and market conditions and 
manpower qualifications.  UNIDO rules and regulations on procurement should be 
reviewed and, if needed, modified in order to allow the target beneficiary to be co-
responsible for the selection of equipment.   
The situation seems to fly in the face of common sense to say nothing of 
development theory, or a reasonable expectation of efficient and effective capital 
formation.  The idea of business decisions made remotely by bureaucrats located 
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thousands of miles away makes little sense from a business perspective.  The UNIDO 
mission team concluded that: 1) the role of equipment and hardware was over-estimated 
and that of human resource development and organization underestimated; 2) in most 
cases, the balance among the inputs of this program was quite reasonable due to rather 
heavy input of expertise, using the experts on a roving basis; and 3) perhaps the only 
element which was inadequately covered was training and advice on company 
management.  For an agency that has been overseeing development for more than four 
decades, this evaluation is mystifying.  The program structure hardly reflects forty years 
of development experience in working out the basic balance of inputs, by the mission 
team’s own analysis, yet the program management was commended for the project. 
The program consisted of a set of projects supporting different development 
partners and beneficiaries in different sub-sectors to address issues in one or more of the 
program components and objectives as follows: Program Management; Hides and Skins; 
Private Industry Development; Environment Protection; Gender Development; Institution 
Development; and Marketing Development. 
The program manager, a Senior Industrial Development Officer assisted by 
another professional at UNIDO headquarters and the Chief Technical Adviser (CTA) 
stationed in Nairobi comprised the project management.  When the program manager 
retired, his role was filled “by one professional staff only” (UNIDO, p. 23).  The CTA 
was responsible for organizing, supervising, and coordinating activities in the field and 
planning the delivery of project inputs.  His role was lessening and the full-time 
arrangement was to be replaced by a part-time one. National counterparts promote, 
coordinate, and administer project activities in the country level.  Some countries had two 
71
national experts.  The mission recommendations for utilizing national experts were as 
follows: the involvement in substantive activities of the project should be enhanced; 
however two national experts could not be justified since “administration of project 
activities [was] hardly a full-time job” (UNIDO, p. 23).  Additionally, the earnings of 
expatriates at a UN salary scale were “far above the national salary scales” which created 
difficulties in establishing working partnerships within the country.   
There is a remarkable double standard for the number of nationals and expatriates 
and salary expectations.  Ten countries participated in the UNIDO RALFIS program, so 
at most, there were 20 national administrators.  In contrast, fifty-eight foreign experts 
were fielded during Phase II from 1994 to 1996 (see Table 6).  Their employment, stated 
in terms of man/months varied from half a month to almost three years, however more 
than half of the experts consulted for less than three months.  The program expenditure 
for 440.3 man/months of foreign experts totaled $3,980,512.  The average salary per man 
month was $9,047—equivalent to $11,643 in 2007 constant dollars or an annual salary of 
140 K. 
Phase 1 was implemented in coordination with FAO and International Trade 
Center (ITC).  Phase 2 was implemented without formal involvement of FAO.  
Cooperation with ITC ended in 1995.  UNIDO program management felt cooperation 
limited rather than generated added value and involved high administrative costs.  
However, the program management believed that ongoing information exchange with 
FAO and ITC would prevent unnecessary duplication.   
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Hides and skins component 
The purpose of this component was to improve the quality of hides and skins and 
increase their collection in selected areas by: 1) supporting extended service training in 
methods of slaughtering and leather handling; 2) constructing demonstration slaughter 
slabs and curing sheds; 3) introducing a Quality Grading System as well as advising on a 
motivational system for applying it; 4) and statistical monitoring of the quality and 
quantity of skins and hides.  The results achieved on this component were “rather 
dubious” (UNIDO, p. 40).  This component was arguably the most important.  
Innumerable studies have repeated that the quality of leather begin with animal 
husbandry, slaughtering techniques, and collection methods.  Yet, this component seemed 
to hold the least interest for the UNIDO program. 
Government decentralization and the decision to delegate extension services to 
regional authorities makes it difficult to maintain hides and skins extension services at the 
previous level, therefore nationals particularly welcomed project support in this area.  
The mission evaluation, which generally seem to view extension services as a nuisance 
dismissed the request stating that the project could not extend the support of regional 
authorities to the extension services in the whole country” (UNIDO, p. 40).  The 
following observations were noted: equipment selection was problematic; flaying knives 
delivered to regional authorities were not distributed to potential users and their current 
location was unknown; the effectiveness of training could not be established; and 
extension officers complained of frequent staff turnover among flayers due to low 
salaries.   
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Local knowledge and expertise dismissed and devalued. 
The construction of slaughter slabs and sheds was behind schedule and less than 
planned in terms of the number to be constructed or rehabilitated.  Design and 
specification changes required approval from Vienna making implementation “rather 
cumbersome” (UNIDO, p. 41).  Slab construction costs were increasing.  Ownership of
the slabs and sheds was not in the hands of the users, resulting in little motivation or 
responsibility for facility operation and maintenance, thus diminishing project 
sustainability.  Local professionals however could acquire information about the design 
and construction requirements and replicate the structures within the country themselves.  
Application of the grading system developed by UNIDO under Phase 1 was limited.  The 
evaluation mission recommended a study to make recommendations for mechanisms of 
motivating and enforcing pricing by grades. 
The impact of the project on the quantity and quality of collected hides and skins 
varied among the four countries visited but overall was considered modest.  However, the 
evaluation mission felt the evidence indicated that both the extension services and the 
demonstration effects of slabs and sheds can only play a supporting role in the hides and 
skins improvement.   
The key factor influencing the quantity of the collected hides and skins is 
centralized slaughtering and pricing which would require considerable investment.  The 
mission recommendation was that program play a significant role in this field by acting 
as a catalyst in the search for policy solutions (UNIDO, p. 42).  Simple solutions such as 
building more sheds that the country can handle as previously noted are regarded 
undeserving of UNIDO attention which should focus rather on grand schemes requiring 
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considerable investment and significant roles for international agencies as catalyst in 
policy solutions are always preferred.  The problem is that a top down approach rarely 
addresses or results in basic development. 
The evaluation mission felt that extension services and the demonstration effect of 
slabs and sheds played only a supporting role in the improvement of hides and skins.  In 
reality, the key factor influencing the quantity of collected hides and skins was the price 
level and that in turn was influenced by centralized slaughtering and pricing of the hides 
by grades.  Development priorities dictate an increase in centralized slaughtering and the 
introduction of pricing by grades, while the program priority expressed by the mission 
team was to play significant role as a catalyst for policy solutions.  The mission granted 
the need for investment in centralized slaughtering and introducing a system of pricing by 
grades.  Nevertheless, its recommendations included downplaying UNIDO involvement 
in the construction of infrastructure (slaughtering slabs and sheds) and gradually passing 
on such activities to national associations.  The program role should be advisory and 
training support to policy bodies and extension services in making the pricing and 
procurement system more effective. 
Comments containing the words motivation or motivational occurred seventeen 
times in the mission evaluation.  These statements offer noteworthy insight into criticism 
of expatriate attitudes and manner.  Of the ten concerning the program, four were 
recommendations for the program to institute a motivational system, four were 
compliments of the programs impact on trainee motivation, and two noted a program 
feature that diminished motivation.  The seven references to recipient included five 
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observations about a lack of staff motivation.  Two references were made in the 
following contexts:  
The drying shed related to the slaughterhouse was in use but the worker 
started suspending the hides more than 4 hours after the slaughter and his 
handling of the hide (holes for the rope unnecessarily too large) prompted 
comments to which, however, he did not react.  Apparently training alone without 
proper motivation is not sufficient to improve quality of hides and skins.  
There were also complaints by the extension officers that the butchers and 
flayers did not follow the instructions and advice given during training seminars 
and about frequent staff turnover among flayers due to low salaries.  Apparently 
training alone without proper motivation is not sufficient to improve quality of 
hides and skins (UNIDO, 1997, pp. 41, 97).  
 
The first situation and both observations arguably demonstrate an air of condescension to 
which the mission evaluator appears to be insensible.  It is easy to imagine unsolicited 
advice from a foreign visitor putting off even a highly motivated individual.  A dynamic 
other than the lack of motivation was very likely at work in the interaction. 
Environment protection component 
The purpose of the environment protection component was to improve tannery 
effluent treatment and waste management capabilities by introducing environment 
friendly technology.  However the actual output dealt only with establishing effluent 
treatment facilities.   
Four tanneries in Tanzania received UNIDO-provided effluent treatment 
equipment.  The report emphasized that ETP equipment arrived at Morogoro “in due 
time” even though it was not operational because incongruously, basic tannery equipment 
for the plant had not yet been obtained.  At Mwanza Tannery, ETP equipment was 
delivered but not yet installed due to difficulties adapting the civil works.  The UNIDO 
provided aerators needed modification and the expected results would require further 
improvements.  The tannery at Moshi was in the process of installing the new equipment 
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but aeration system clogged rapidly due to an inappropriate type of diffuser.  Contrary to 
the claim of “good results in rehabilitating tanneries and establishing effluent treatment 
plants,” program equipment that represented 68% of the aid funding to Tanzania, at a cost 
$389,365, produced absolutely no development results for the country. 
The report stated that little work was done in solid waste management either for 
safe-disposal or solid waste recovery and suggested this issue be addressed in the next 
program phase because recovering of untanned waste was a major concern.  The 
evaluation mission concluded however, that “the tanners became sensitive to 
environmental issues” and this was an important output of the project even though it is 
not explicitly planned.  Furthermore, the impact of the program supported ETP was 
assessed under the assumption that gradually all of them be put into operation.  Thus, 
according to the report, despite nonfunctional effluent treatment equipment at three 
tanneries, sensitivity to environmental issues satisfactorily fulfilled the development 
program objectives to protect the environment. 
 
Gender development 
The purpose of the gender development component was to heighten awareness of 
the importance of women's contribution to the development of the sector, to enhance their 
capabilities in the industry, and to assist their effective integration.  The output of this 
component was an analysis of the status of women in the leather sector and the 
recommendation of a three pronged strategy to create awareness of the role of women; 
training women in industrial activities; and creating self assertiveness among women and 
female entrepreneurs working in the sector.  One hundred and fifty women attended 
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awareness raising seminars, ten women entrepreneurs were supported with equipment, 
expert advice, and participation at fairs.  UNIDO published a document entitled Policies, 
Strategies, and Guidelines to Promote the Integration of Women in the Leather Industry.
However, the program objective of creating 150 employment opportunities for women 
was not achieved.  The evaluation team felt the output was “rather ambitious” and should 
not have been considered a component objective (UNIDO, 1997, p. 48). 
 
Institution building 
The term “institution building” is used frequently in the RALFIS evaluation 
report and in development literature generally.  Discovering what it actually refers to can 
be a challenge because it often serves as a vague catchall category for an assortment of 
activities for improving “the institutional capacities for human resource development” 
(UNIDO, 1997, p. 48).  A training center for shoe manufacturing in Kenya received 
equipment valued at $313,000 as a component of “institution building.”  The report 
described the equipment as well selected, even though the apparatus covered only part of 
the leather footwear manufacturing process, namely shoe uppers, and the training center 
lacked shoe finishing equipment.   
The Tanzania Institute of Leather Technology (TILT) which had been established 
at some unspecified time in the past with the assistance of UNDP/UNIDO held training 
equipment for the complete shoe manufacturing process, but never started actual 
operations.  Due to a long period of idleness and neglect, the equipment, if usable at all 
would have required reconditioning.  Seven persons were still being paid as employees of 
the Institute; though reviving the project was highly improbable.   
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Yet another example of dubious institution building in the report was 
approximately 50 sets of manuals on footwear manufacturing.  These manuals are an 
example of foreign aid that is self serving to the donor and of little or no use to the 
recipient.  The budget funds for producing these manuals were a contribution from India.  
The amount of $621,350 was recorded as foreign aid to African countries.  But the 
references were developed and produced in India by Indian businesses and then some of 
the manuals were distributed to the program countries in Africa.  Essentially the Indian 
aid subsidized Indian businesses.  And what is more, the manuals were manufacturing 
references rather than the self instruction books in the original specification.  Yet, the cost 
of manuals, $621,350, or approximately $12,000 per set was still recorded as a 
contribution to the program component of institution building.  
 
Marketing Development  
The purpose of the marketing development component was to increase the export 
of finished leather and leather products.  The intended RALFIS outputs were an export 
marketing strategy and sample shoe collections for exhibit at trade fairs.  Additionally, 
the program was to facilitate beneficiary involvement at selected trade fairs; and expose 
entrepreneurs to market intelligence.  The actual output included a technical paper and 
booklet produced jointly by UNIDO and ITC entitled “Exporting Footwear from Africa;” 
a marketing and design expert who advised on product design and training in production 
methods and related management systems; and attendance by some program participants 
at fairs in Germany Italy, and Hungary.  The total value the shoe exports provided by the 
program amounted to $600,000.  For a number of companies, participation at trade fairs 
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did not result in actual export deliveries.  The quality and design of their export samples 
were not up to market standards, their price expectations were unrealistically high, and 
the entrepreneurs could not meet quantity or delivery time requirements.   
 
Taiwan – US Interests in Foreign Aid 
A contrasting example of how foreign aid can be utilized in a manner more 
beneficial to the recipient state is illustrated in the following.  Between 1950 and 1962, 
USAID sponsored development programs in the industrial sector of Taiwan.  A very 
different set of procedures and goals created a very different set of results. 
The US has made no secret of viewing foreign economic assistance as “one 
instrument for advancing American interests in a stable and free world order” (Jacoby, 
1966, p. 55).  This represents self-interest, not altruism.  Foreign aid assistance results 
from decisions involving the allocation of total funds for national security among 
economic aid and other national security instruments; the allocation of economic 
assistance among the several regions of the world; the allocation of economic assistance 
among several countries within the Far East region; and finally decisions regarding the 
programs structure, financial terms, budgetary channeling, composition, distribution 
among factors of the economy, and the allocation among projects.  Unlike the higher 
order of decisions which are ultimately unilateral decisions of the US government, the 
final level of decisions are necessarily joint decisions of the governments of the US and 
the recipient country.  This is a very different posture than what LDCs typically 
encounter in international organizations. 
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Specific benchmarks of evaluation were applied for judging the productivity of 
US aid: 1) The announced developmental goals of the Chinese government in 
relationship to the performance of Taiwan's economy; 2) the overall rise in Taiwan's GNP 
per dollar of U.S. aid in relation to that attained in comparable Asian countries; 3) the 
annual rate of increase in Taiwan's GNP during 1951 to 1965 in comparison with that 
attained in the period 1911to 1945 under Japanese Colonial administration; 4) the degree 
to which allocations of aid and of domestic investments among sectors of the economy 
approached the optimum; 5) the degree to which selection of aid projects approached the 
optimum; 6) the degree to which the instrumental structure of US assistance approaches 
the optimum with respect to statutory purposes, resource inputs, and financial terms; and 
7) the degree to which actual aid administration conformed to the ideal, given the 
practical constraints upon policy. 
US Program Administration in Taiwan  
The administration of aid in Taiwan involved institutions and processes of the U.S. 
and of the Chinese governments.  U.S. AID (the new acronym was truncated to USAID) 
was the executive agency charged with administering U.S. economic assistance in 
Taiwan.  Other agencies were also involved, but USAID managed the high degree of 
coordination that characterized the program.  The director, selected by the USAID 
administrator, exerted strong influence on the character of the program as a result of his 
presence on the ground, his intimate acquaintance with local needs and resources, and his 
intimate contact with Chinese government officials—this could be called his overall 
embeddedness.  Though he lacked the final authority to approve projects and obligations, 
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he was able and aggressive and made policy as well as administering it, and his influence 
determined the competence level and morale of the mission staff.  He interpreted U.S. 
policy objectives to the Chinese government, had large de facto powers in setting the 
priorities of the project, and exerted influence over the nature of Chinese development 
policies.  Economic activities of the mission team were coordinated with all U.S. military 
and civilian missions through the country team, a committee comprised of all U.S. 
military and civilian missions, chaired in Taiwan by the U.S. Ambassador.   
Primary aid administrators for the Chinese were a small and equally well 
coordinated group of officials who worked with the regular ministries of the Chinese 
government and the Taiwan provisional government responsible for executing the 
national government policies.  Since development projects were the major focus, the 
mission organization was based on sectors of Taiwan's economy.  An extensive schedule 
of capital and technical assistance projects was administered by the mission staff, which 
arranged and monitored the activities of numerous consultants and contractors.  During 
1962, when the primary U.S. objective began phasing out aid and allowing the private 
sector to take over, the mission reorganized along functional lines of capital resources, 
management resources, and technical resources. 
U.S. funds financed a contract between the Chinese government and a New York 
engineering firm that made the technical and economic studies of projects proposed by 
the Chinese government for U.S. assistance.  The contract with the New York firm was 
broad and flexible.  The company identified investment opportunities.  It worked up 
technical evaluations for presentation and screened Chinese candidates to travel to the 
U.S. for technical training.  In 1957, its technical staff numbered 32 Americans.  The firm 
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provided professional consultation to the Chinese government and de facto project review 
to the U.S. aid mission.  The arrangement helped speed up action on projects.  Over the 
twelve years of the mission, the total personnel averaged 350 people including 
consultants, contractors, and Chinese personnel.  Three significant reasons for the 
effectiveness of the U.S. aid to the Republic of China were the high degree of 
cooperation between Chinese in American officials; the semi autonomy of the principal 
Chinese agencies of aid administration; and the continuity of the institutions and their 
personnel in the development program.   
Early in 1950, when the U.S. began aid operation in Taiwan, the conditions were 
far from the macro economic stability required by today's structural adjustment 
conditionality programs.  Rampant inflation, critical shortages of food and clothing, and 
the influx of refugees dictated a large commodity import program to meet basic needs of 
Taiwan's people and foster social stabilization.  Initially, American officials unilaterally 
determined which commodities to procure and import for distribution by the Chinese 
government.  However, by early 1951, at the suggestion of the mission director, the 
economic stabilization Board, consisting of senior Chinese government officials, was 
established.  The minister of finance and the governor of Taiwan served on the 
commission, its functions were to review and coordinate trade issues and monetary and 
fiscal policies.  No American was a member of the mission, but the mission had 
representation at meetings and played an active role in formulating policy. 
The Joint Commission originated as an organ to implement the China Aid Act.  
The Commission was charged with the duty of using U.S. aid to foster rural development 
in Taiwan.  It was jointly led by three Chinese and two American commissioners 
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appointed by the respective presidents of both countries and later by two Chinese and one 
American.  The commission represented the closest possible relationship between two 
governments based on strong common interest and a high degree of mutual confidence.  
The commission provided about 40 percent of the budget receipts of the Taiwan 
Provincial Department of Agriculture, advised and monitored land reform in Taiwan 
during 1949 to 1953, improved rural health conditions, and fostered improvements in 
technology for water resources and agriculture.  The Commission’s basic policy was to 
respond to the expressed needs of local sponsoring organizations, but commissioners 
frequently initiated projects ideas that were subsequently implemented.  The joint 
commission was unique as a vital organ of Taiwan’s development. 
The success or failure of foreign aid as a development tool depends entirely upon 
the manner of its use.  When used properly, it can substantially benefit the recipient state.  
When used improperly, it can easily hinder development, creating a situation that is no 





The structure and function of foreign aid is complex and arcane.  It is vital for the 
public to gain an understanding of foreign aid because it embodies crucial contemporary 
issues that have political, economic, and social implications for fairness and justice— 
ideals that American hold deeply.  Taxpayers in donor states finance the foreign aid and 
populations in recipient states are subject to its forces.  For the most part neither group 
really understands or is even aware of the economic world order in play around them.  
People in least developed countries struggle against powers of which they have little or 
no comprehension.  Meanwhile taxpayers in donor states are made complicit in an 
economic world order with which they very likely disagree.   
A new way of financing development aid would give Americans a chance to live 
out our ideals of equity, justice, and fair play and to put forward our best foot, not our 
worst.  It could help to end an exploitative and injurious economic imperialism that in a 
sense involves every taxpayer who is unaware or uninformed.  A new way finance 
development could bring fairness and equity in the global distribution of resources.  
 
An alternative mechanism of aid funding 
In Foreign Aid—A Critique and a Proposal (1968), authors Albert O. Hirschman 
and Richard M. Bird said the current aid giving processes were “sufficiently defective to 
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warrant the search for new techniques” (p. 14).  The basic requirements for satisfactory 
new alternative mechanism of foreign aid funding: 1) should permit the transfer of a 
substantial volume of funds to LDCs; 2) should not be tied to conditionality on central 
economic policy decisions in recipient countries; and 3) should exert pressure toward the 
efficient use of the funds that are provided (p. 14).  The authors envisioned two additional 
features of a new scheme: 4) placing international development on a people to people 
basis; and 5) institutionalizing openly and firmly the redistribution of income from rich to 
poor countries. 
It is exciting to consider that in the intervening years, since Hirschman and Bird 
(1968) originally proposed this idea, the advances in communication and information 
technology that have occurred, provide a mechanism in the Internet for implementing the 
scheme in a manner that was inconceivable at the time.  As Figure 2 illustrates, the design 
lends itself to gradual introduction that can initially supplement rather than replace 
existing flows of foreign aid.  Figure 3 presents the essence of the plan to involve the 
individual taxpayer in foreign aid.  Taxpayers can elect to contribute a limited portion of 
their income tax obligation to one or more of several world development funds.  These 
funds would be administered independently of specific countries, and channel financial 
assistance to public and private investors in developing countries.  Taxpayers would 
receive a full tax credit from the IRS for their contribution to financial aid. 
 
How does this differ from present funding by international organization? 
Present multilateral funding depends entirely and directly on Government 
contribution.  In other words, the government rather than the taxpayer individually is the 
86
source of funds.  Multiple funds would have to compete in contrast to the single 
monolithic entities of the IMF, the World Bank, and the United Nations system.  This 
would give recipients the choice of where to request funds.  They would be able to select 
the funds that were most conducive to their needs. 
Individual taxpayers could select qualifying activity in a manner similar to the 
way individuals currently choose their own charities.  They could support the 
development funds whose activities matched their concerns, for example, a fund that 
specialized in providing clean water or one the focused on rural education.  Despite many 
points requiring further study and consideration, the primary merit of plan would be 
avoiding the interference in the domestic economic policies of recipient countries.  There 
would be no question of foreign control either by the US government, international 




Adelman, I., & Morris, C. T. (1967). Society, politics & economic development : a 
quantitative approach by Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins Press. 
Adelman, I., & Morris, C. T. (1997). Development History and its implications for 
development theory. World Development, 25(6), 831-840. 
Barnett, M. N., & Finnemore, M. (1999). The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of 
International Organizations. 53(4), 699-732. 
Dadaglio, G. (2003). Africa positions itself for the global leather market [Electronic 
Version]. International Trade Forum. Retrieved 11/7/2005 from 
www.tradeforum.org/news/printedpage.php/aid/549.
Dorfman. (1991). Economic Development from the beginning to Rostow. Journal of 
Economic Literature, 29(2), 573-591. 
Dorner, P. (1973). Book Review: Economic Imperialism (Boulding, Kenneth E.). 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 55(2), 347-348. 
Easterly, W. (1999). The ghost of financing gap: testing the growth model used in the 
international financial institutions. Journal of Development Economics, 60(2), 
423-438. 
Easterly, W. (2002). The Cartel of Good Intentions: the Problem of Bureaucracy and 
Foreign Aid. Policy Reform, 5(4), 223-250. 
Erixon, F. (2005). Aid and Development: Will Work This Time? London: International 
Policy Network. 
Gaud, W. S. (1968). Foreign Aid: What It Is; How It Works; Why We Provide It. 
Department of State Bulletin, 603-606. 
Greenhill, R. (2006). Real Aid 2: Making Technical Assistance Work. Johannesburg: 
ActionAid International. 
Greenhill, R., & Walt, P. (2005). Real Aid: An Agenda for Making Aid Work.
Johannesburg: ActionAid International. 
Griffin, K. B., & Enos, J. L. (1970). Foreign Assistance: Objectives and Consequences. 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 18(3), 313-327. 
Hayter, T. (1971). Aid as Imperialism: Penguin Books. 
Hirschman, A. O. (1965). Obstacles to Development: A Classification and a Quasi-
Vanishing Act. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 13(4), 385-393. 
88
Hirschman, A. O. (1971). A bias for hope : essays on development and Latin America by 
:Albert O. Hirschman. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 
Hirschman, A. O., & Bird, R. M. (1968). Foreign aid--a critique and a proposal.
Princeton, N.J.: International Finance Section Princeton University. 
Huntington, S. P. (1971). Foreign Aid for What and for Whom (II). Foreign Policy(2), 
114-134. 
Hurley, G. (2006). Wolfowitz needs to look at corruption of yesterday, not just today and 
follow the positive example of Norway [Electronic Version] from 
http://www.eurodad.org/article/default.aspx?id=708.
Jabbar, M. A., Kiruthu, S., Gebremedhin, B., & Ehui, S. (2002). Essential actions to meet 
quality requirements of hides, skins and semi-processed leather from Africa.
Tunis, Tunisia: Common Fund for Commodities. 
Jacoby, N. H. (1966). U.S. aid to Taiwan; a study of foreign aid, self-help, and 
development. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 
Krasner, S. D. (1968). The International Monetary Fund and the Third World. 22(3), 670-
688. 
Krueger, A. (1986). Aid in the Development Process. World Bank research observer, 
1(1), 57-78. 
Landau, G. D. (1959). Considerations on an International Administrative Service. 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 8(1), 48-68. 
Mathur, H. M. (1986). Experts of the United Nations in Third World development: a 
view from Asia. In D. Pitt & T. Weiss (Eds.), The nature of United Nations 
bureaucracies (pp. 165-186). Boulder Colorado: Westview Press. 
Montrie, C. (1973). The Organization and Functions of Foreign Aid. Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, 21(4), 697-713. 
Morgenbesser, S. (1973). Imperialism: Some Preliminary Distinctions. Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, 3(1), 3-44. 
Morgenthau, H. (1962). A Political Theory of Foreign Aid. The American Political 
Science Review, 56(2), 301-309. 
Morris, C. T., & Adelman, I. (1988). Comparative patterns of economic development, 
1850-1914 Baltimore Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Muchie, M. (2000). Leather Processing in Ethiopia and Kenya: lessons from India. 
Technology in Society, 22, 537-555. 
Myrdal, G. (1970). The challenge of world poverty; a world anti-poverty program in 
outline. New York: Pantheon Books. 
Papanek, G. F. (1972). The Effect of Aid and Other Resource Transfers on Savings and 
Growth in Less Developed Countries. The Economic Journal, 82(327), 934-950. 
Prempeh, E. O. K. (2001). The Politics of One-Sided Adjustment in Africa: A Response 
to Professor Osabu-Kle. Journal of Black Studies, 31(5), 563-580. 
89
Reinstra, D. (2004). African leather industry meets world markets [Electronic Version]. 
International Trade Forum. Retrieved 11/7/2005 from 
www.tradeforum.org/news/printedpage.php/aid/783/African_leather_industry_me
ets_world_market's.
Robinson, S. (1972). Theories of Economic Growth and Development: Methodology and 
Content. 21(1), 54-67. 
Scullion, M. (2004). A blueprint for the African leather industry: A development, 
investment and trade guide [Electronic Version]. Retrieved 11/7/2005 from 
http://www.unido.org/en/doc/21398.
Selowsky, M. (2005). IMF technical assistance: evaluation report (No. HG3881.5.I43). 
Washington DC: International monetary fund. 
UNIDO. (1997). Regional Africa Leather and Footwear Industry Scheme Report of the 
program evaluation: (pp. 141): Quality Assurance and Evaluation Branch General 
Management. 
Von Mises, L. (1983). Bureaucracy (1983 ed.). Grove City, PA: Libertarian Press Inc. 
Weiss, R. M. (1983). Weber on Bureaucracy: Management Consultant or Political 
Theorist? The Academy of Management Review, 8(2), 242-248. 
Wood, R. E. (1986). From Marshall Plan to debt crisis : foreign aid and development 
choices in the world economy. Berkeley: University of California Press. 









Figure 4a Priorities Achieved 
 
Donor Program Expatriate 
2, 9  5, 6, 16 17 
Recipient Development National 
PrioritiesA
chieved 1, 3, 4  
 
Figure 4b Priorities Unachieved 
Donor Program Expatriate 
11 13, 15  
Recipient Development National 
PrioritiesU
nachieved
7 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 10, 12, 14, 18  
 
Figure 4c Cost of Experts and Training 
Program Total Expert Cost Experts 
Training 
Cost Trainees Equipment 
XA/RAF/94/
639 90,157 44,047 3 40,085 12 0 
XA/RAF/95/
610 143,219   139,719 30 3500 
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Table 5 (RALFIS Evaluation Report page 30) 
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Table 6 (RALFIS Evaluation Report pages 31-32) 
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Table 7 (RALFIS Evaluation Report page 54) 
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Table 8a Hides Scheme (RALFIS Evaluation Report page 96) 
Table 8b Delivery of Inputs (RALFIS Evaluation Report page 97) 
Table 8c Delivery of Inputs (RALFIS Evaluation Report page 105) 
Table 8d Inputs Delivered (RALFIS Evaluation Report page 118) 
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Table 8e Equipment and Tools (RALFIS Evaluation Report page 119) 
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